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ABSTRACT




This thesis is a study of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). It
examines the formation and stability of self-enforcing IEAs by addressing three im-
portant aspects: (i) the impact of heterogeneity among countries on stability, (ii)
the e¤ect of transfers among heterogeneous countries on stability (iii) the role is-
sue linkage (environmental and trade policies) can play in enhancing international
environmental cooperation.
Chapter 1 investigates IEAs among heterogeneous countries in a two-stage non-
cooperative game with quadratic benet and environmental damage functions and
simultaneous choice of emissions. The model is solved analytically, and it is shown
that stable agreements cannot be larger with asymmetric than symmetric countries.
Their size remains small and their membership depends on the degree of heterogene-
ity. Moreover, results reveal that introducing asymmetry into a stable, under sym-
metry, agreement can disturb stability. Therefore, the assumption of homogeneity is
not the determining factor driving the pessimistic result of very small agreements.
Chapter 2 is an extension of Chapter 1, implementing policies (transfers) that can
increase cooperation incentives among heterogeneous countries. It is shown that in
the presence of transfers the size of a stable coalition can be enlarged, due to the con-
tribution of those that are more sensitive to environmental pollution. As the degree
iii
of heterogeneity increases, the size of a stable, under transfers, agreement increases
as well. However, the analysis demonstrates that reductions in emissions (due to the
enlargement of the coalitions) and welfare improvements are rather small, conrming
the persistent conclusion in the literature noted as the "paradox of cooperation".
Chapter 3 considers the formation and stability of Global Agreements (GAs).
The basic model of the IEAs literature is extended by letting identical countries
choose emission taxes and import tari¤s as their policy instruments to manage cli-
mate change and control trade. Results illustrate the importance of environmental
and trade policies working together to enhance cooperation in e¤ective agreements.
Contrary to the IEA model, stable agreements are larger and more e¢ cient in re-
ducing global emissions and improving welfare. Furthermore, the analysis indicates
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INTRODUCTION
Climate change is arguably the most important and pressing problem humanity
currently faces. There is almost unanimous international consensus that "warming of
the climate system is unequivocal" and that "human inuence on the climate system
is clear" (IPCC, 2014). Thus, decisive and speedy policy action to mitigate climate
change is required. Although 165 countries have already submitted their pledges to
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, known as the Nationally Determined Contri-
butions (NDCs), following the 21st Conference of the Parties of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Paris, there are serious
doubts as to whether the national pledges will be materialized and, even if they do,
whether they will be enough to meet the target of below 2C increase in average
global temperature.
The slow progress of coordinating action at the international level to mitigate
climate change is a typical example of the obstacles faced in the provision of public
goods (or the mitigation of public bad). Given that costs of reducing Greenhouse
Gases (GHGs) are very high while their benets are spread globally, countries may
choose not to implement the necessary policies opting instead to free-ride on other
countriesactions. Climate change shares these problems with a number of other
global environmental problems, such as ozone depletion, biodiversity and marine
pollution. For some of these issues, International Environmental Agreements (IEAs)
1
have been reached, successfully tackling the problem, such as the Montreal Protocol
on substances responsible for the depletion of the ozone layer. In some other areas,
such as climate change, international negotiations to strengthen actions are still
ongoing.
The importance of climate change and the inability of the international commu-
nity to achieve a global agreement to successfully address the problem, has spurred a
substantial literature on IEAs in recent years. A large part of the literature, recogniz-
ing the interdependence among countrieschoices and the widely spread externalities,
which lead to the strategic behavior of countries involved in negotiating IEAs, uses
game theory as the tool of analysis. A critical characteristic of IEAs is the lack of a
supranational authority that could implement and enforce environmental policies on
sovereign states. Like in any other pure public good provision problem, every coun-
try has an incentive to free-ride on otherse¤orts. It does so by avoiding the cost of
abating its emissions while at the same time enjoying the benets of lower aggregate
emissions achieved by the countries that remain faithful to the agreement. Since the
socially optimal outcome cannot be enforced, IEAs di¤er from a typical public good
and thus, they have to be self-enforcing in the sense that they have to account for the
countriesincentives to cheat on or withdraw from the agreement. Consequently, the
presence of strong free-riding incentives and the absence of a supranational author-
ity can clearly explain the reasons for which global agreements, for instance Kyoto
Protocol, fail to achieve their targets, and so climate change is still speeding.
The main body of the literature studies the formation of IEAs considering that
countries signing an agreement (called signatories) form a coalition and maximize
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the coalitions aggregate welfare, while non-members (called non-signatories) act
non-cooperatively maximizing their individual welfare. Within this non-cooperative
framework, countriesbehavior is modelled as a two-stage game, where in the rst
stage countries decide whether to join the coalition, while in the second stage they
choose their emission level (or abatement level) depending on their membership sta-
tus. In the second stage, it is assumed that countries either choose emissions (or
abatements) simultaneously (Cournot approach) or that the coalition acts as a leader
and the non-signatory countries follow (Stackelberg approach). The subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium of the resulting two-stage game is usually derived by applying the
notions of the internal and external stability conditions developed by DAspremont
et al. (1983) and extended to IEAs by Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett
(1994). That is, an IEA is considered to be stable if none of its participating countries
has an incentive to withdraw (internal stability) and none of the non-participating
countries has an incentive to further join the agreement (external stability), assuming
that the remaining players in the game do not revise their membership decision.
Theoretical results are pessimistic. The literature shows that the size of a stable
coalition is small, regardless of the total number of countries. The main reason is that
strong free-riding incentives discourage countries to take cooperative actions in order
to promote environmental protection. Assuming quadratic cost and benet functions
and simultaneous choice of emissions, it has been shown that stable coalitions consist
of no more than two countries (De Cara and Rotillon, 2001; Finus and Rundshagen,
2001; Rubio and Casino, 2001; among others). If the coalition is assumed to be a
leader, a stable coalition could have more than two members, but still a maximum
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of four countries. Barrett (1994) suggests that a stable coalition may achieve a high
degree of cooperation, including the grand coalition, but only when an accumulation
of stock pollutant is assumed and therefore per period abatements can exceed per
period emissions. In contrast, Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006) demonstrate that,
when no stock pollutant is present and emissions must be positive (interior solution),
a stable coalition cannot have more than four members.
The same dismal result is obtained even when the static model is extended to
a dynamic framework, which approximates climate change much closer since it in-
troduces stock instead of ow pollutants (Calvo and Rubio, 2013). It is only when
the coalition formation is modelled as an innitely repeated game allowing defectors
punishment that could sustain full cooperation (Barrett, 1999), especially if multiple
coalitions are considered (Asheim et al., 2006).
Departing from the assumption of the non-cooperative games, another part of
the IEAs literature applies the core concept of stability to examine coalition for-
mation (Chander and Tulkens, 1995 and 1997). The cooperative approach asserts
the formation of the grand coalition and the attainment of e¢ ciency, assuming that
when a country deviates it expects that the agreement collapses. The concept of
farsighted stability has been used to bridge the gap between these two polar cases.
It assumes that when a country defects from an agreement it does not make any
assumption regarding the behavior of the coalitions remaining members. Instead, it
foresees what their reaction will be, and which equilibrium agreement will result from
such a deviation. Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2002) formally dene the concept of
farsighted stability and provide the complete characterization of the farsighted sta-
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ble set, permitting renegotiation among countries if an IEA collapses. Diamantoudi
and Sartzetakis (2015) and (2017) examine respectively the case in which groups
of countries may coordinate their actions or act independently, in either joining or
withdrawing from an agreement, and in both cases nd, using general functional
forms, that by not restricting countries to a myopic behavior, increases the set of
possible stable coalitions. The above results have been veried in a dynamic setting
(de Zeeuw, 2008; Biancardi, 2010) and by using a multi-regional computable general
equilibrium model (Lise and Tol, 2004).
One of the most restrictive assumptions of the literature so far is the homogeneity
of countriescosts and benets. It is widely accepted that both damages su¤ered
from a global pollutant and benets derived from emitting the pollutant (related
to production and consumption) di¤er signicantly among countries. A number of
papers have tried to address the issue by introducing heterogeneity. Assuming two
types of countries, Barrett (1997) nds no substantial di¤erence in the size of the
stable coalition relative to the homogeneous case. On the contrary, McGinty (2007),
allowing for transfer payments through a permit system, nds that asymmetries
can increase the coalition size. Moreover, Chou and Sylla (2008), Osmani and Tol
(2010) and Biancardi and Villani (2010) examine stability considering also two types
of countries. In particular, Chou and Sylla (2008) explain theoretically why it is
more likely that some developed countries can form a small stable coalition rst,
and then engage in monetary transfers to form the grand coalition. Osmani and
Tol (2010) allow the formation of two separate coalitions and demonstrate that with
high environmental damages, forming two coalitions yields higher welfare and better
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environmental quality relative to a unique coalition. Biancardi and Villani (2010)
nd that stability depends on the level of the asymmetry and the grand coalition can
be obtained only by transfers. Using transfers, Weikard (2009) shows as well that
under asymmetry large coalitions may be stable.
In their paper, Fuentes-Albero and Rubio (2010) introduce also two types of
countries di¤ering either in abatement costs or environmental damages (which are
assumed to be linear on emissions) and nd that heterogeneity has no important
e¤ect without transfers, but if transfers are allowed the level of cooperation increases
with the degree of heterogeneity in environmental damages.1 On the other hand,
Pavlova and de Zeeuw (2013) assuming di¤erences in both emission-related benets
and environmental damages (which are assumed to be linear on emissions), nd
that large stable coalitions are possible without transfers if the asymmetries are
su¢ ciently large, however, the gains of cooperation are very low, and that transfers
could improve the gains of cooperation.2 More recently, Finus and McGinty (2017)
employ an abatement choice model introducing any type and degree of asymmetry
regarding benets (which are assumed to be linear in the aggregate contribution) and
costs.3 They show that, under certain conditions, even without transfers the grand
1Their environmental damage function takes the expression miX, where mi > 0 is the marginal
environmental damage and X =
PN
i=1 xi are the total emissions with xi capturing the level of
emissions generated by country i 2 N .
2In their study, they use an objective function of the form, i = i(iqi   0:5q2i )   iQ. The
rst term is the benet function and the second term is the environmental damage function. Also,
qi denotes emissions by country i, Q is the total emission level and i > 0, i > 0 and i > 0.
3They apply an abatement model using an objective function of the form, i = ibQ   ic2 q2i .
The rst term is the benet function from the aggregate abatement level Q and the second term is
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coalition can be stable with signicant gains from cooperation. The conditions can
be relaxed when transfers are introduced.
In the aforementioned papers, transfers are mainly implemented using the optimal
transfer scheme. That is, when the coalition payo¤ equals or exceeds the sum of
the outside option payo¤s then every coalition member receives at least his free-
rider payo¤ plus a share of the remaining surplus (Eyckmans and Finus, 2004). As
the review indicates, results of the theoretical literature are mixed. Some papers
support the idea that allowing for heterogeneity yields larger stable coalitions, with
and without transfers, while others claim that transfers are necessary to induce
cooperation (Petrakis and Xepapadeas, 1996; Botteon and Carraro, 1997 and 2001).
Realizing the importance of heterogeneity, the present thesis modies the basic
(non-cooperative) model of the IEAsliterature with quadratic cost and benet func-
tions and simultaneous choice of emissions by introducing heterogeneous countries
(Chapter 1). The model is solved analytically, and it is shown that allowing for het-
erogeneity does not yield larger stable agreements. On the contrary, if heterogeneity
is strong enough, a smaller stable agreement results relative to the homogeneous
case. Chapter 1 complements the existing literature by proving that stable agree-
ments cannot be larger with asymmetric than symmetric countries. Therefore, the
assumption of homogeneity is not the determining factor driving the pessimistic re-
sult of very small agreements. Heterogeneity can exacerbate rather than reduce the
free-riding incentives. To that end, the model is extended by implementing policies
the individual country is abatement cost from its own contribution qi. Also i > 0, i > 0, b > 0
and c > 0.
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(transfers) that can increase cooperation incentives among countries (Chapter 2).
Results indicate that the presence of transfers can enlarge the size of a stable coali-
tion. However, reductions in emissions (due to the enlargement of the coalitions) and
welfare improvements are small. Chapter 2 complements the existing literature by
demonstrating that transfers can increase participation in IEAs, but only due to the
contribution of those countries that are more sensitive to environmental pollution.
As the degree of heterogeneity increases, the size of a stable, under transfers coali-
tion, increases as well. The analysis conrms the "paradox of cooperation" (Barrett,
1994) which states that when cooperation matters most, the associated benets are
minimal, especially when heterogeneity is strong.
Finally, another research line in IEAsliterature, that is related to the present
thesis and has to be discussed, is the studies that address the formation of environ-
mental (or climate) coalitions linked to trade policies. During recent years, there has
been considerable debate on the extent to which international trade and environ-
mental problems a¤ect each other and whether trade and environmental policies can
coherently work together to support e¤ective climate coalitions. Clearly, cooperation
in international environmental issues di¤ers from most other international problems
(Barrett, 2005). Environment is a global public good, and thus in an IEA members
cannot exclude non-members from enjoying the benets of a better environment.
On the other hand, in trade agreements, free trade is not treated as a global public
good and non-signatory countries can be excluded from enjoying the benets of a
free trade agreement.
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Some of the existing IEAs include provisions that can a¤ect trade. Specically,
trade measures can regulate or restrain the trade in particular materials or products,
either between members of the treaty and/or between members and non-members.
For example, the Montreal Protocol contains specic trade measures in the form
of requirements for a ban on trade between parties and non-parties in products
containing or made with ozone-depleting substances (ODS). One of the main goal
of those measures was to maximize participation in the Protocol, by excluding non-
members from supplies of ODS. According to International Institute for Sustainable
Development (IISD), some of the countries that participated in the treaty did so
because of the trade provisions. Moreover, trade sanctions have been utilized in
the Basel Convention (international transportation of hazardous waste), and the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). With respect
to a specic product, the U.S. has applied a penalty tax on foreign automobile
manufacturers not meeting the domestic Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
standards.
The relevant literature of IEA and trade is surprisingly not so extensive. Even
though trade measures can be an e¤ective tool in the formation of climate coalitions
and should always be taken into consideration when an IEA is designed, only a few
papers deal with that issue. Initially, Barrett (1997) analyzes an IEA formation
problem in a partial equilibrium model with abatement and illustrates that trade
sanctions can help to support cooperation, even full cooperation, among countries.
Lessmann, Marschinski, and Edenhofer (2009) apply a dynamic model of climate
coalition formation and use trade sanctions as an instrument to promote partici-
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pation. In their model, coalitions are free to impose tari¤s on imports from non-
cooperating countries. According to their results, participation in the coalition rises
and global welfare also rises along with participation.
More recently, Eichner and Pethig (2013) and (2014) study environmental agree-
ments in a model with international trade. Applying a cap and trade regulation,
they nd that international trade does not improve the conditions for the formation
of e¤ective stable climate coalitions. In particular, agreements are very small and
hence ine¤ective in reducing emissions if coalitions play Nash equilibrium (Eichner
and Pethig, 2014), however, agreements may be larger but also ine¤ective if coali-
tions behave as Stackelberg leaders (Eichner and Pethig, 2013). Eichner and Pethig
(2015), replacing the cap with a tax policy, demonstrate that, when countries em-
ploy carbon taxes to ght climate change, the grand coalition is stable (imposing
some necessary and su¢ cient conditions) whether Nash or Stackelberg approaches
are assumed.4 In all the above-mentioned papers (Eichner and Pethig, 2013, 2014 and
2015), the formation of stable self-enforcing IEAs is examined in a free trade world
economy. Finally, another study that has explored this idea is the paper by Nordhaus
(2015). He applies a numerical general equilibrium model and uses tari¤ sanctions,
that are taken as exogenous, to encourage participation in climate agreements. He
nds that trade penalties on non-participants induce a large stable coalition with
high levels of abatement.
4They use emission taxes as a climate policy instrument while assuming that trade is free among
countries.
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In the light of the above, it is clear that the interaction between climate coalition
formation and trade is very important. Apparently, if non-cooperative countries
expect trade costs, they may have incentives to join environmental agreements. The
basic assumption underlying the necessity of trade measures is that compliance with
an IEA is costly for some countries (i.e. the non-participants) who express strong
free-riding incentives. The purpose of trade costs are therefore to prevent those
countries (by deteriorating their terms of trade) from enjoying their competitive
advantage in trade with other countries controlled by the environmental agreement.
To that end, Chapter 3, extends the basic (non-cooperative) model of the IEAs
literature with symmetric countries, quadratic cost and benet functions and simul-
taneous decisions by incorporating trade. To our knowledge, this is the rst study
in the literature that examines the formation of global agreements where countries
choose both emission taxes and import tari¤s as their policy instruments to manage
climate change and control trade. Results illustrate that the interaction between
trade and environment policies is essential to enhance cooperation in e¤ective agree-
ments. Contrary to the IEA model, stable agreements are larger and more e¢ cient
in reducing global emissions and improving welfare.
The rest of this thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 examines the formation
and stability of self-enforcing IEAs addressing the impact of heterogeneity among
countries on stability. Chapter 2 is an extension of Chapter 1 and studies the e¤ect
of transfers among heterogeneous countries on stability. Finally, Chapter 3 investi-




INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS -
THE IMPACT OF HETEROGENEITY AMONG
COUNTRIES ON STABILITY
1.1 Introduction
The present chapter examines the stability of self-enforcing IEAs among hetero-
geneous countries in a two-stage, non-cooperative emission game.1 In the rst stage
each country decides whether or not to join the agreement, while in the second
stage the quantity of emissions is chosen simultaneously by all countries (Cournot
approach). We use quadratic benet and environmental damage functions and as-
sume k types of countries di¤ering in their sensitivity to the global pollution. The
model is solved using backward induction and the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
is derived by applying the notions of the internal and external stability conditions
(DAspremont et al., 1983).
The main purpose of this study is to examine the formation and stability of
environmental agreements relaxing the restrictive and unrealistic assumption of ho-
mogeneous countries, an assumption made by many studies in the IEAsliterature.
1This chapter is a joint work with my supervisor Dr. E¤rosyni Diamantoudi (Department
of Economics, Concordia University) and Dr. Eftichios Sartzetakis (Department of Economics,
University of Macedonia).
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It is widely accepted that countries are heterogeneous with respect to costs and
benets due to emissions. In other words, both damages su¤ered from the global
pollutant and benets derived from emitting the pollutant (related to production
and consumption activities) di¤er signicantly among nations.
Our analysis is mostly related to Fuentes-Albero and Rubio (2010) and Pavlova
and de Zeeuw (2013) in the sense that we examine self-enforcing IEAs in a model
with asymmetric countries. However, our model departs from theirs in that we
apply a di¤erent functional form regarding environmental damages. In their models,
Fuentes-Albero and Rubio (2010) and Pavlova and de Zeeuw (2013) use a damage
function that is linear in the aggregate emissions.2 With a quadratic environmental
damage function the analysis becomes more complex but more interesting as well,
since we are able to capture the interaction e¤ects between heterogeneous countries
due to global pollution (high degree of interdependence among countries).
The main contribution of the present analysis is the proof that, in the absence of
policies (e.g. transfers) able to increase cooperation among countries, stable coali-
tions cannot be larger with asymmetric than symmetric countries. In particular, we
provide an analytical solution of the model and show that, in the case of two types,
introducing heterogeneity does not enhance the size of a stable agreement compared
to the homogeneous case. On the contrary, under heterogeneity, when stable coali-
tions exist their size remains small and their membership depends on the degree of
2We employ the damage functional form, Dji (E) =
1
2c
jE2. To be consistent with the analysis
derived in Fuentes-Albero and Rubio (2010) and Pavlova and de Zeeuw (2013) our damage function
should be simplied to Dji (E) = c
jE.
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heterogeneity. That is, the maximum number of countries that cooperate is two and
when heterogeneity is strong enough, coalitions cannot include countries belonging
to di¤erent types. Moreover, results indicate that heterogeneity can reduce the scope
of cooperation relative to the homogeneous case. We prove that coalitions that are
stable under symmetry they may become unstable when asymmetry is introduced.
Therefore, we conclude that the assumption of homogeneity is not the determining
factor driving the pessimistic result of very small agreements.
Our analysis also conrms that the symmetric approach is a special case of the
asymmetric approach. When we simplify the asymmetric analysis, assuming that
there exist only one type of countries, the results from our model can be paralleled
with those in Rubio and Casino (2001) who examine the basic model with identical
countries, quadratic cost and benet functions, and simultaneous decisions.3
The remaining of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 describes the
model for the k asymmetric types and solves for the countrieschoice of emissions.
Section 1.3 presents the stability conditions. Section 1.4 studies the two-type case,
examines the existence and stability of an IEA when countries are asymmetric in
environmental damages and presents a counterexample where a stable coalition is
not possible. Section 1.5 concludes.
3Our model utilizes a slightly di¤erent benet function. Rubio and Casino (2001) assume that
the quadratic benet function for each country takes the form, Bi(qi) = aqi  b2q2i , where qi denotes
emissions by country i, a > 0 and b > 0.
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1.2 The model
We assume that there are k asymmetric types of countries. LetK = f1; 2; 3; :::; kg
denote the set of types and the letters m; j 2 K denote types. For each type j 2 K








Each country i of type j 2 K generates emissions eji > 0 as a result of its economic
activity.4 It derives benets, expressed as a function of those emissions Bji (e
j
i ), which
are assumed to be strictly concave, Bji (0) = 0, B
j0
i  0 and Bj00i < 0. Therefore,
benets rise at a decreasing rate. It also su¤ers damages from the aggregate emissions
of the global pollutant Dji (E), which are assumed to be strictly convex, D
j
i (0) = 0,
Dj0i  0 andDj00i > 0. A convex environmental damage function implies that damages
from emissions increase at an increasing rate and so gradually reduce ecosystem
services. In other works, more emissions cause more harm on nature.






















the aggregate emission level.
The social welfare of each country i of type j, W ji , is dened as the di¤erence
between total benets from its own emissions and environmental damages from ag-
4The superscript j denotes the type of the country and the subscript i denotes a particular
country belonging to type j.
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gregate emissions,






Substituting the specic functional forms, country is of type j social welfare is,















where i 2 N j = f1; 2; 3; : : : ; njg and j 2 K.
1.2.1 Coalition formation
Wemodel the process of the heterogeneous countriesdecision as a non-cooperative
two-stage game and we examine the existence and stability of a self-enforcing coali-
tion aiming at controlling emissions. In the rst stage, each country i of type j
decides whether or not to join the coalition, while in the second stage, chooses its
emission level. We assume that only a single coalition can be formed and we deter-
mine the equilibrium number and type of countries participating in the coalition by
applying the notions of internal and external stability of a coalition (DAspremont
et al., 1983). We also assume that when a country contemplates joining or defecting
from the coalition, it assumes that no other country will change its decision regard-
ing participation in the coalition. Furthermore, we consider that members of the
coalition act cooperatively, maximizing their joint welfare, while non-members act in
a non-cooperative way, maximizing their individual welfare, and that in the second
stage all countries decide their emission level simultaneously (Cournot approach).
In particular, for each type j 2 K a set of countries Sj  N j signs an agreement
to reduce the emissions of the global pollutant and N jnSj do not. Let sj = jSjj
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for all j 2 K. Each signatory of type j emits ejs, such that Esj = sjejs, and thus
the coalitions total emissions are Es =
P
j2K s
jejs. Similarly, each non-signatory
of type j emits ejns, such that Ensj = (n




j   sj)ejns. Therefore, the aggregate emission level is,






j   sj)ejns, for all j 2 K.
1.2.2 Choice of emissions
Signatories maximize the coalitions welfare given by Ws =
P
j2K s
jW js . There-

























For each type j 2 K let the parameter j be the ratio between environmental
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The expression 	 is always positive since nj  sj and is not type specic. The
value of the expression depends only on the total number of the asymmetric types.






















































(nj   sj)j: (1.11)








































To determine the existence and stability of a coalition, we use the notions of
the internal and external stability developed by DAspremont et. al (1983). The
internal stability implies that no coalition member has an incentive to leave the
coalition, while the external stability implies that no country outside the coalition
has an incentive to join the coalition, assuming that the remaining countries do not
revise their membership decision. In our case, these conditions should be specied
for all types of countries, j 2 K. Let s be a k dimensional vector that denotes
the numbers of signatories of each type, i.e. s = (s1; :::; sk). Similarly, let s j be a
(k   1) dimensional vector that denotes the numbers of signatories of all types but
j.
Thus, for some country of type j 2 K, the internal and external stability condi-
tions take the following forms respectively:
Wjs (sj; s j)  Wjns(sj   1; s j); (1.15)
Wjs (sj + 1; s j)  Wjns(sj; s j): (1.16)
In this context, a coalition is characterized stable if the internal and external
conditions are satised at the equilibrium s for all countries of all k types.
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Substituting the values of the indirect welfare functions from (1.13) and (1.14),
the internal and external stability conditions are derived.







!2 264 1 + m

































2   1 + m	2
375  0: (1.18)
1.4 Two-type case
Considering two types of countries, such that j 2 fA;Bg, the analysis presented
in the general case with k asymmetric types can be simplied as follows.5








where c is the ratio of the slopes of the marginal environmental damages and b is the
ratio of the slopes of the marginal benets, of type A over type B countries.
The expression 	 takes the form,
5For the two-type case, we use the notation j 2 fA;Bg instead of j 2 f1; 2g for presentation
reasons in order to prevent superscript from being interpreted as a power.
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Alternative, we can write the expression 	 as,
	 = 1+A(nA sA)+B(nB sB)+A(sA)2+B(sB)2+(Ac 1+Bc)sAsB: (1.21)
Signatories maximize the coalitions welfare given by Ws =
P
j s
jW js , with j 2
fA;Bg, that is, Ws = sAWAs + sBWBs . Therefore, signatories choose ejs by solving

















where E = sAeAs + s
BeBs + (n
A   sA)eAns + (nB   sB)eBns.
The equilibrium emission levels are,
eAs = a
A   





B(aAnA + aBnB)(csA + sB)
	
: (1.24)
The aggregate emission level by all signatories is,
Es = a









Non-signatories maximize their own welfare given by W jns, with j 2 fA;Bg, by









where E = sAeAs + s
BeBs + (n
A   sA)eAns + (nB   sB)eBns.











The aggregate emission level by all non-signatories is,
Ens = a
A(nA   sA) + aB(nB   sB)  (a
AnA + aBnB)
	
(A(nA   sA) + B(nB   sB)):
(1.29)





Substituting the equilibrium values of the choice variables from (1.23), (1.24),
(1.27) and (1.28) into equation (1.3), we derive the indirect welfare functions of
signatories (WAs and WBs ) and non-signatories (WAns and WBns) for both types of
countries.











































1.4.1 The case of homogeneity
Before we proceed we compare our results to the homogeneous case. When coun-
tries are identical it means that there is only one type of countries. Without loss
of generality, we assume that nA = nB = n
2
and sA = sB = s
2
. Moreover, we sim-
plify the parameters as follows: aA = aB = aI ; bA = bB = bI ; and cA = cB = cI .6
Therefore, in the symmetric case, c = b = 1 since c = c
A
cB




we dene  = c
I
bI
, which indicates the relationship between environmental damages
and benets due to emissions for all countries i 2 N = f1; 2; 3; : : : ; ng. Emissions
of signatories are es and of non-signatories are ens. The welfare of signatories and
non-signatories are Ws and Wns, respectively.
6The superscript I is used to denote that countries are identical.
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where 	 = 1 + (n  s) + s2.





























Substituting the equilibrium values of the choice variables from (1.35) and (1.37)
into equation (1.3), assuming that there is only one type of countries, we derive the


























By collapsing the results of the previous Section to homogeneous countries, we
get the same results derived in Rubio and Casino (2001), noting that we use di¤erent
notations and a slightly di¤erent benet function.7 Consequently, as expected, the
symmetric approach is a special case of the asymmetric approach.
1.4.2 Existence and stability of a coalition
In order to derive analytical results we restrict the asymmetry between the two
types of countries in the environmental damage function. Given that we have to re-
strict heterogeneity, the choice of keeping heterogeneity of countriesdamages seems
more appropriate since the strongest part of countriesstrategic interactions is cap-
tured, in the model, through global pollution. That is, we assume cA 6= cB while
aA = aB = aI and bA = bB = bI .8 For simplicity we set nA = nB = n. Furthermore,
without any loss of generality, we assume that c > 1, implying that cA > cB and
since b = b
A
bB
= 1, we have A > B. Therefore, in this context, type A countries
have a steeper marginal environmental damage function compared to type B coun-
tries. Thus, type A countries su¤er higher marginal environmental damages at any
level of global pollution, which implies that they are more sensitive to environmental
pollution.
7Rubio and Casino (2001) assume that the quadratic benet function for each country takes the
form: Bi(qi) = aqi   b2q2i , where qi denotes emissions by country i, a > 0 and b > 0. It is trivial to
derive the equivalence between the parameters.
8Following the same notation as in Section 1.4.1, the superscript I in parameters a and b, i.e.
aI and bI , is used to denote that countries are identical with respect to benets.
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Under these assumptions and using the internal stability condition (1.17), we













where   = A + B, c = 
A
B
(since b = 1) and 	 = 1 + A(n   sA) + B(n   sB) +













Similarly, using the external stability condition (1.18), we derive the external






1 + sA + c 1sB
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(	 + 2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1 + csA + sB
2
(	 + 2BsB +  sA)2





The following result asserts that no stable coalition can contain more than 2
members of the same type.
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Lemma 1 For all sj  3, the internal stability conditions are violated for all j 2
fA;Bg.
Therefore, if a stable coalition exists, it can consist of maximum four members
since sj < 3, for all j 2 fA;Bg. Table 1.1, presents the cases along with the
appropriate conditions under which stable agreements exist.
Table 1.1: Stable agreements
sB
0 1 2
0 (0; 0) (0; 1) (0; 2)
condition (1.48)
sA 1 (1; 0) (1; 1) (1; 2)
condition (1.46)
2 (2; 0) (2; 1) (2; 2)
condition (1.49)
Lemma 2 Only the non-trivial coalitions (sA = 1; sB = 1), (sA = 0; sB = 2) and
(sA = 2; sB = 0) can be stable.
Only the non-trivial coalitions along the main diagonal of the Table 1.1 can
support stable agreements. For those coalitions, the internal stability conditions are
satised under some necessary and su¢ cient conditions. In particular, for n  3 and
A > B, we have the following three cases.
Case 1:





n  2 +p4n2   6n+ 3 : (1.46)
In the specic case where A = B the model represents the symmetric case.
Under symmetry, a coalition consisting of two countries is the unique self-enforcing
IEA if and only if,
A = B(= )  1
n  4 + 2pn2   3n+ 3 : (1.47)
The derived restriction (1.47) is identical to the one presented in the literature
with symmetric countries (De Cara and Rotillon, 2001; Rubio and Casino, 2001)
under which an agreement of size two is stable.
Case 2:
The coalition (sA = 0; sB = 2) is a stable agreement only if,
A  2
p







n  2 +p4n2   6n+ 3 : (1.48)
Case 3:







3 + n (n (1  B) (1  4B)  3 (1  2B))

   1 + (3n  2)Bn





n  2 +p4n2   6n+ 3 : (1.49)
The following Proposition summarizes the results of the above analysis.
Proposition 3 Stable coalitions and membership:
i) The mixed coalition (sA = 1; sB = 1) is stable only under minimal asymmetry,
that is, when countries are almost identical (cA is very close to cB).
ii) When asymmetry increases, the coalition consists only of one type of countries.
iii) When the coalition (sA = 0; sB = 2) is stable, the coalition (sA = 2; sB = 0) is
stable as well.
iv) When the mixed coalition is stable, the other two coalitions, (sA = 0; sB = 2) and
(sA = 2; sB = 0), are stable as well.
v) A trivial coalition exists when asymmetry becomes very extreme (cA and cB di¤er
signicantly).
1.4.2.1 Aggregate emissions
According to the above analysis, a stable agreement can exist in three possible
ways. That is, Case 1: (sA = 1; sB = 1), Case 2: (sA = 0; sB = 2), and Case 3:
(sA = 2; sB = 0). We can now compare the aggregate emissions among these three
possible cases.
Case 1: (sA = 1; sB = 1).
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The aggregate emission level is,
E =
2aIn
1 +  (n+ 1)
: (1.50)
Case 2: (sA = 0; sB = 2).
The aggregate emission level is,
E =
2aIn
1 +  n+ 2B
: (1.51)
Case 3: (sA = 2; sB = 0).
The aggregate emission level is,
E =
2aIn
1 +  n+ 2A
: (1.52)
Since A > B, we can easily verify that global emissions are lower in Case 3 and
higher in Case 2. Hence, with a high level of asymmetry, such that only the coalition
(sA = 2; sB = 0) satises stability, we can achieve the lower level of global emissions.
Lemma 4 The constraints presented in Section 1.4.2 guarantee that emissions of
both signatories and non-signatories are always positive.
1.4.3 Case of instability under heterogeneity
The literature (De Cara and Rotillon, 2001; Finus and Rundshagen, 2001; Rubio
and Casino, 2001) has shown that when countries are symmetric, a coalition consist-
ing of two members is the unique self-enforcing agreement. Nonetheless, when we
allow countries to be heterogeneous, the analysis shows that asymmetry can have an
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inverse e¤ect on stability. The result, presented in the Proposition below, indicates
that heterogeneity has negative implications on the scope of cooperation relative to
the homogeneous case. Specically, we demonstrate that introducing asymmetry
into a stable, under symmetry, coalition can disturb stability.




1 for some j 2 fA;Bg may not exist, unlike the case of homogeneous countries.
Proof. To prove the above Proposition, we provide a numerical counterexample
where a non-trivial stable coalition does not exist when we relax the homogeneity
assumption. We set the following values of the parameters: aI = 10, bI = 6 and
nA = nB = 5 (i.e. n = 5), while cA = 0:55 and cB = 0:25.9 Using these values, we
derive, A = c
A
bI




Consider rst the case that all countries are symmetric (they are all of type B).
The condition for the coalition (s = 2) to be stable is given in (1.47). For the
numerical example, the stability condition requires that   0:0433125, which is
satised given that n = 10, bI = 6 and cI = 0:25. Therefore, in the case of ten type
B countries, a coalition of two countries is stable (in accordance to the literature) and
the aggregate emission level is given by equation (1.39), thus E = a
In
1+(n s)+s2 = 66:7.
We now examine stability in the case of two types of countries. Table 1.2 presents
the stability conditions that fail in each of the possible coalitions. As already noted,
only the non-trivial coalitions along the main diagonal of the Table 1.1 can support
9Following the same notation as in Section 1.4.1, aI and bI are used to denote that countries
are identical with respect to benets.
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stable agreements under the conditions presented in Section 1.4.2. However, in all
three possible coalitions, (sA = 1; sB = 1), (sA = 0; sB = 2) and (sA = 2; sB = 0),
the corresponding internal stability conditions are violated. Consequently, stability
can be achieved only under the trivial coalition (sA = 1; sB = 0), indicating that
there is no stable agreement where
P
j s
j > 1 for some j 2 fA;Bg.
Table 1.2: No stable agreement
sB
0 1 2
0 (0; 0)   (0; 2)
WBs (0; 2) < W
B
ns(0; 1)
sA 1 (1; 0) (1; 1)  
WBs (1; 1) < W
B
ns(1; 0)
2 (2; 0)    
WAs (2; 0) < W
A
ns(1; 0)
We rst check the stability conditions for the coalition (sA = 2; sB = 0), i.e. con-
dition (1.49). The second condition, given that n = 5, yields the following threshold
for the parameter B, B < 0:0433125. This condition is satised since for the values
of the parameters in the present example B = 0:0416.
The rst condition in (1.49), given that n = 5 and B = 0:0416, requires that
A  0:0463334. This condition is not satised since for the values of the parameters
A = 0:0916. Therefore, the rst condition in (1.49) is violated, implying that the
coalition (sA = 2; sB = 0) is unstable. Note that, both conditions (1.46) and (1.48)
are more restrictive for the parameter A relative to (1.49) (Proof, see Appendix). As
a consequence, none of the other two coalitions (sA = 1; sB = 1) and (sA = 0; sB = 2)
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can be stable as well. Thus, stability is achieved only under the trivial coalition




Therefore, in the case of symmetric type B countries, a stable agreement of size
two is possible. On the contrary, if half of the countries are more sensitive to pollution
(higher value of cj) relative to the other halve of type B countries, a stable agreement
is not always possible. The latter result holds when asymmetry is very strong, that
is, when parameters cA and cB di¤er signicantly.
Note that aggregate emissions in the case of ten symmetric type B countries, two
of which form a coalition to reduce their emissions, are E = 66:7. In the case of
ve type A and ve type B countries, case that does not allow the formation of any
stable coalition, aggregate emissions are E = 60. Although this is expected since
half of the countries (type A countries), being more sensitive to pollution, emit less
than the other half (type B countries), it is worth noting that the existence of stable
coalitions is not necessary related to lower global emissions.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the e¤ect of heterogeneity on stability in the case of the
above numerical counterexample. We set sB = 0 and investigate at which sA the
internal stability condition of type A countries is satised. In particular, we plot
the indirect welfare functions of type A countries against di¤erent coalition size sA
when sB = 0. The welfare for the signatories, i.e. WAs (sA; sB), is depicted by the
solid line and the welfare for the non-signatories, i.e. WAns(sA; sB), is depicted by the
dotted line. Moreover, the welfare WAns(sA   1; sB) is depicted by the dashed line
and represents the welfare for the non-signatories shifted by one (we use that line to
represent graphically the internal stability condition).
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Figure 1.1: Type A countrieswelfare functions when sB = 0
As indicated in the gure, when sB = 0 the internal stability condition of type
A countries, condition (1.15), is satised only at sA = 1. In particular, at this
point (sA = 1; sB = 0) the internal stability condition is satised with equality, i.e.
WAs (1; 0) = WAns(0; 0). Obviously, at the point (sA = 2; sB = 0) the condition is
violated since WAns(1; 0) > WAs (2; 0). Hence, the only stable coalition is the trivial




> 1 for some j 2 fA;Bg does not exist.
1.5 Conclusions
The present paper examines the existence and stability of IEAs in a two-stage non-
cooperative game assuming heterogeneous countries that di¤er in their sensitivity to
the global pollutant. A coalition is considered stable when none of the coalitions
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members wish to withdraw and no country outside the coalition wishes to join. We
use quadratic functions and further assume that in the second stage all countries
make their decisions simultaneously.
Our results show that, relaxing the widely used in the literature assumption of
symmetric countries, the size of stable coalitions attempting to mitigate environ-
mental problems remains small. The largest possible coalition that can be achieved
includes only two countries and the membership of the coalition is mainly driven
by the degree of the asymmetry. In particular, the mixed coalition that includes
one country of each type, i.e. (sA = 1; sB = 1), is possible only when heterogene-
ity is very small. This case is close to the symmetric case, where according to the
literature a coalition of two countries is the unique self-enforcing agreement. When
heterogeneity is strong enough, a possible coalition consists of two countries again
but they belong only to one type, either type A or type B, depending on the level of
asymmetry. Under moderate heterogeneity, a coalition can contain either two type
B countries, i.e. (sA = 0; sB = 2), or two type A countries, i.e. (sA = 2; sB = 0).
However, when the level of heterogeneity is stronger, a stable coalition can consist
only of two type A countries, i.e. (sA = 2; sB = 0), and this coalition supports the
lower level of global emissions.
An important outcome of the present analysis is that heterogeneity can have
grave implications on the scope of cooperation in comparison with the homogeneous
case. We show that, introducing asymmetry into a stable, under symmetry, agree-
ment can disturb stability. We provide a counterexample where a coalition does
not exist when countries exhibit a strong level of asymmetry in environmental dam-
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ages. Consequently, heterogeneity can exacerbate rather than reduce the free-riding
incentives.
1.6 Appendix
In what follows we present the proofs of Lemmas and Propositions.
Proof of Lemma 1. The internal stability condition for type A countries is
satised if and only if condition (1.42) is satised. Rearranging,
2AbI(aIn)2

(1 + A)	2   (1 + A(sA + c 1sB)2)(	  2A(sA   1)   sB)2




The sign of this condition depends on the sign of the expression in the numerator.
Hence,
(1 + A)	2   (1 + A(sA + c 1sB)2)(	  2A(sA   1)   sB)2  0: (1.54)
Recalling that c = 
A
B
,   = A+B, and 	 = 1+A(n sA)+B(n sB)+A(sA)2+
B(sB)2 +  sAsB and rearranging terms we obtain,
(1 + A)(1 + n  + AsA(sA   1) + BsB(sB   1) +  sAsB)2 
(1 + A(sA +
B
A
sB)2)(1 + n  + AsA(sA   3) + (BsB   A)(sB   2) +  sAsB)2  0:
(1.55)
The term (1+A(sA+ 
B
A
sB)2) is greater than (or at least equal to) the term (1+A)
for all sA  1. The above expression can be positive for sA < 3 and A < 2B given
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sB. For all sA  3, the second term: (1 + A(sA + B
A
sB)2)(1 + n  + AsA(sA  
3) + (BsB   A)(sB   2) +  sAsB)2, is greater than the rst term: (1 + A)(1 +
n + AsA(sA  1) + BsB(sB   1) +  sAsB)2, and the internal stability condition is
violated.
The internal stability condition for type B countries is satised if and only if
condition (1.43) is satised. Rearranging,
2BbI(aIn)2

(1 + B)	2   (1 + B(csA + sB)2)(	  2B(sB   1)   sA)2




The sign of this condition depends on the sign of the expression in the numerator.
Hence,
(1 + B)	2   (1 + B(csA + sB)2)(	  2B(sB   1)   sA)2  0: (1.57)










1 + n  + (AsA   B)(sA   2) + BsB(sB   3) +  sAsB2  0:
(1.58)
The term (1+B( 
A
B
sA+sB)2) is greater than (or at least equal to) the term (1+B)
for all sB  1. The above expression can be positive for sB < 3 given sA. For all
sB  3, the second term: (1 + B( A
B
sA + sB)2)(1 + n  + (AsA   B)(sA   2) +
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BsB(sB   3)+ sAsB)2 is greater than the rst term: (1+ B)(1+ n + AsA(sA 
1) + BsB(sB   1) +  sAsB)2, and the internal stability condition is violated.
Consequently, the internal stability conditions, i.e. (1.42) and (1.43), are satised
at the equilibrium for all countries of both types j 2 fA;Bg for all sj < 3.
Proof of Lemma 2. Table 1.3 presents analytically the cases under which sta-
ble agreements exist. According to Lemma 1, the internal stability conditions are
satised for all sj < 3; for all j 2 fA;Bg. Therefore, we have to examine only the
cases where sj  2. An agreement is stable if the stability conditions, presented in
equations: (1.42), (1.43), (1.44) and (1.45), are satised at the equilibrium. Table
1.3 includes all the possible coalitions. For each stable coalition, we state the appro-
priate conditions that ensure stability, while for each non-stable coalition we mention
the condition that is violated. For n  3 and A > B we have the following cases.
Table 1.3: Possible coalitions
sB
0 1 2
(0; 0) (0; 1) (0; 2)
0 Trivial coalition conditions (1.68)
and (1.71)
sA (1; 0) (1; 1) (1; 2)
1 Trivial coalition conditions (1.64) condition (1.61)
and (1.71)
(2; 0) (2; 1) (2; 2)
2 condition (1.72) condition (1.62) condition (1.63)
Trivial coalition:
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Each combination above the main diagonal of Table 1.3, i.e. (sA = 1; sB = 0)
and (sA = 0; sB = 1), consists a trivial coalition. A trivial coalition exists if one of













3 + n (n (1  B) (1  4B)  3 (1  2B))

   1 + (3n  2)Bn





n  2 +p4n2   6n+ 3 : (1.60)
Violation of internal stability:
The coalitions below the main diagonal of Table 1.3, i.e. (sA = 1; sB = 2),
(sA = 2; sB = 1) and (sA = 2; sB = 2), fail to satisfy the internal stability condition
for type B countries. In particular, we have:





[(n+ 1)2(A)3 + (n+ 1)(3(n+ 1)B + 2)(A)2
+((3n+ 4)n(B)2 + (2n+ 1)B + 1)A + ((n2   4)(B)2   5B   1)B] < 0:
(1.61)






[(n+ 2)2(A)3 + 2(n+ 2)(1 + nB)(A)2
+(((n  1)n  3)(B)2 + (n  3)B + 1)A   (1 + B)(1 + (n+ 1)B)B] < 0:
(1.62)




[4(n+ 4)2(A)4 + 8(n+ 4)(2(n+ 3)B + 1)(A)3
+((n+ 2)(23n+ 86)(B)2 + 20(n+ 3)(B) + 4)(A)2
+2((12 + 7n(n+ 4))(B)2 + (5n  2)(B) + 2)BA
+
 
(n  2)(3n+ 10)(B)2   2(n+ 14)B   5 (B)2] < 0: (1.63)
Possible stable agreement:
Only the non-trivial coalitions lying along the main diagonal of Table 1.3, i.e.
(sA = 1; sB = 1), (sA = 0; sB = 2) and (sA = 2; sB = 0), can support stable
agreements under some necessary and su¢ cient conditions.
The coalition (sA = 1; sB = 1) is stable under the following conditions:





n  2 +p4n2   6n+ 3 ;
n2(A)4 + 2n(1 + 2nB)(A)3 + ((5n2   2n  1)(B)2 + (4n  1)B + 1)(A)2 
2(( n2 + 2n+ 1)B + 2)(B)2A   (1 + B)((2n+ 1)B + 2)(B)2  0: (1.64)
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Rearranging terms and simplifying,
(n2   4)(A)3 + ((3n+ 4)nB   5)(A)2+
((3(n+ 1)2(B)2 + (2n+ 1)B)  1)A + ((n+ 1)B + 1)2B  0: (1.66)
When countries are identical, an agreement consisting of two countries is stable if
and only if,
A = B(= )  1
n  4 + 2pn2   3n+ 3 . (1.67)
The condition (1.67) is derived by replacing n with n
2
in the rst condition in (1.64),
since in the symmetric case nA = nB = n
2
while in the asymmetric case we assume
that nA = nB = n. The derived restriction (1.67) is identical to the one presented
in the literature with symmetric countries (De Cara and Rotillon, 2001; Rubio and
Casino, 2001) under which an agreement of size two is stable.
The coalition (sA = 0; sB = 2) is stable under the following conditions:
The internal stability condition for type B countries is satised. The condition holds











n  2 +p4n2   6n+ 3 : (1.68)







Rearranging terms and simplifying,
 (n+ 1)(A)3   ((3 + n(1  n))B + n+ 2)(A)2+
(2n(n+ 2)(B)2 + (n  3)B   1)A + ((n+ 2)B + 1)2B  0: (1.70)
The external stability conditions (1.66) and (1.70) are not binding when parame-
ter B satises the following condition,
B  2
5(n  1) + 4p4n2   6n+ 3 . (1.71)
The coalition (sA = 2; sB = 0) is stable under the following conditions:
The internal stability condition for type A countries is satised. The condition holds







3 + n (n (1  B) (1  4B)  3 (1  2B))

   1 + (3n  2)Bn





n  2 +p4n2   6n+ 3 : (1.72)
The external stability conditions for both types are satised.
Proof of Proposition 3. For B < 1
2(n 2+
p
4n2 6n+3) , the constraint for the
parameter A in (1.64) is always stricter than its constraint in (1.68), which is always





3 + n (n (1  B) (1  4B)  3 (1  2B))

   1 + (3n  2)Bn
(n  2)(2 + 3n) >
2
p






n  2 +p4n2   6n+ 3 : (1.73)




In this case, asymmetry is minimal (A is very close to B implying that cA is very
close to cB) and countries are almost identical. When asymmetry increases, meaning
that A > 1
2(n 2+
p
4n2 6n+3) , the mixed coalition is unstable. In this case, a stable
coalition consists only of one type of countries and its membership depends on the
degree of heterogeneity.
Given that the constraint for the parameter A in (1.68) is always stricter than
its constraint in (1.72), when the coalition (sA = 0; sB = 2) is stable, the coalition
(sA = 2; sB = 0) is stable as well. Moreover, given that the constraint for the
parameter A in (1.64) is always stricter than its constraint in (1.68), when the
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coalition (sA = 1; sB = 1) is stable, the coalition (sA = 0; sB = 2) is stable as well,
and as a consequence the coalition (sA = 2; sB = 0) is also stable.
To summarize, when the coalition (sA = 1; sB = 1) is stable the other two
coalitions, (sA = 0; sB = 2) and (sA = 2; sB = 0), are stable as well and when the
coalition (sA = 0; sB = 2) is stable, the coalition (sA = 2; sB = 0) is also stable.
Thus, if the coalition (sA = 2; sB = 0) fails to satisfy stability requirements, none
of the other two coalitions, (sA = 0; sB = 2) and (sA = 1; sB = 1), can be stable.
Therefore, when heterogeneity becomes very extreme (cA and cB di¤er signicantly),
only a trivial coalition exists.
Proof of Lemma 4. The emissions of signatories are given by equations (1.23) and
(1.24). The emissions of non-signatories are given by equations (1.27) and (1.28).



















where   = A+B and 	 = 1+A(n sA)+B(n sB)+A(sA)2+B(sB)2+ sAsB.
Emissions of both signatories and non-signatories are positive for n  3 and
A > B under the following conditions:
When (sA = 0; sB = 0), (sA = 1; sB = 0) and (sA = 0; sB = 1),





In all other cases,
B <
1
(2n  sA   sB)(sA + sB   1) ;
A  1 + 
B(n  sB) + BsB(sB + sA   2n)
(1 + 2n  sA   sB)sA   n : (1.78)
For the stable coalitions, i.e. (sA = 1; sB = 1), (sA = 2; sB = 0) and (sA = 0; sB = 2),
the constraint for the parameter B in (1.78) is simplied as follows,
B <
1
2 (n  1) : (1.79)
We can verify that for n  3, 2  n  2 +p4n2   6n+ 3 > 2(n  1). Hence, the
constraint for the parameter B, i.e. B < 1
2(n 2+
p
4n2 6n+3) , is always stricter than
the constraint B < 1




n  2 +p4n2   6n+ 3 < 12(n  1) : (1.80)
Given that B < 1
2(n 2+
p
4n2 6n+3) , the constraints for the parameter 
A given by
(1.68) and (1.72) are also stricter than its constraint in (1.78).
Therefore, emissions of both signatories and non-signatories are always positive
under any possible stable coalition.
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CHAPTER 2
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS -
STABILITY WITH TRANSFERS AMONG COUNTRIES
2.1 Introduction
The present chapter studies the stability of self-enforcing IEAs among hetero-
geneous countries allowing for transfers.1 We employ a two-stage, non-cooperative
model, similar to the one presented in Chapter 1, and introduce transfers. The se-
quence of moves is as follows. In the rst stage each country decides whether or not to
join the agreement, while in the second stage countries choose their emissions simul-
taneously. Coalition members agree also, in the rst stage, to share the gains from
cooperation. We mainly focus on two types of countries di¤ering in their sensitivity
to the global pollutant. That is, one type of countries su¤ers higher environmental
damages due to aggregate emissions. In examining the impact of transfers on the
coalition size, we apply the notion of Potential Internal Stability (PIS) as dened in
Eyckmans and Finus (2004).
It has been shown, in Chapter 1, that introducing heterogeneity does not enhance
the size of a stable coalition. Therefore, the main purpose of this study is to examine
1This chapter is a joint work with my supervisor Dr. E¤rosyni Diamantoudi (Department
of Economics, Concordia University) and Dr. Eftichios Sartzetakis (Department of Economics,
University of Macedonia).
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whether the presence of transfers can successfully increase cooperation incentives
among heterogeneous counties and improve the gains of cooperation in terms of
reduction in emissions and improvement in welfare levels.
It should be stressed that the main di¤erence between our model and most of the
literature is the functional form of the environmental damages. While most papers
(Fuentes-Albero and Rubio, 2010; Pavlova and de Zeeuw, 2013) use a linear damage
function, we employ a quadratic one.2 With a quadratic function, we can capture the
interaction e¤ects between heterogeneous countries, which seems to have an e¤ect
on the results. Thus, in contrast to Pavlova and de Zeeuw (2013), we nd that large
stable coalitions are possible only with transfers, but when transfers are used we
conrm that cooperation requires strong asymmetry. Furthermore, we show that
the results obtained by Fuentes-Albero and Rubio (2010) hold also for the case of
quadratic environmental damages, but heterogeneity should be stronger to improve
cooperation especially when the number of participating countries increases.
In more details, our results indicate that transfers can increase cooperation in-
centives among heterogeneous countries yielding larger coalition sizes. However,
reductions in emissions and thus welfare improvements are small. Furthermore, the
inducement of larger coalitions can be achieved only with the help of the countries
that su¤er the higher damages. That is, stable agreements consist of two, at the
maximum, countries of the type with the higher environmental damages and many
countries of the type with the lower environmental damages. Strong free-riding in-
2Finus and McGinty (2017) employ an abatement choice model and also assume a benet func-
tion that is linear in the aggregate contribution.
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centives persist among the type of countries that su¤er the higher damages, therefore,
only few of them join the coalition. Using transfers, a small number of this type of
countries can convince a large number of countries from the other type to join the
coalition, but their contribution has small e¤ect on emissions and welfare.
Moreover, the analysis illustrates that as the degree of heterogeneity increases,
the size of a stable, under transfers, coalition increases as well. Our ndings conrm
the persistent conclusion in the literature, rst noted in Barrett (1994) and recently
noted as the "paradox of cooperation", stating that large stable coalitions do not
achieve a lot.
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
model and presents the coalition formation. Section 2.3 solves for the countries
choice of emissions. Section 2.4 analyses the stability of an agreement when coun-
tries are heterogeneous in environmental damages and transfers are used to increase
cooperation incentives. Section 2.5 presents the aggregate emissions and welfare with
and without transfers for stable agreements of di¤erent sizes. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The model
We consider two types of countries, j 2 fA;Bg. We assume that for each type
j there exists a set of N j countries, N j = f1; 2; 3; : : : ; njg, each of which generates
emissions eji > 0 as a result of its economic activity.
3 The set of all countries is dened
by N , where N = NA[NB and the total number of countries is nT = nA+nB. Each
3The superscript j denotes the type of the country and the subscript i denotes a particular
country belonging to type j.
48
country i of type j derives benets from the economic activity, expressed as function
of its emissions, Bji (e
j
i ), which are assumed to be strictly concave, B
j
i (0) = 0, B
j0
i  0
and Bj00i < 0. Therefore, benets rise at a decreasing rate. It also su¤ers damages
from the aggregate emissions of the global pollutant, Dji (E), which are assumed to
be strictly convex, Dji (0) = 0, D
j0
i  0 and Dj00i > 0. A convex environmental
damage function implies that damages from emissions increase at an increasing rate
and so gradually reduce ecosystem services. In other works, more emissions cause
more harm on nature.






























In addition, we incorporate into the model the possibility of welfare transfers
T ji as well as some form of commitment for those countries that decide to pay the
transfers. Transfers T ji can be either positive, i.e. T
j
i > 0, when a country i of type
j receives a payment, or negative, i.e. T ji < 0, when a country i of type j submits a
payment. We make also the standard assumption that transfers balance.
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2.2.1 Countrys welfare function
The social welfare of each country i of type j, W ji , is dened as total benets
from its own emissions minus environmental damages from aggregate emissions,






Substituting the specic functional forms, country is of type j social welfare is,















where j 2 fA;Bg and i 2 N j = f1; 2; 3; : : : ; njg.
2.2.2 Coalition formation
We model the process of the countriesdecisions as a non-cooperative two-stage
game and examine the existence and stability of a self-enforcing coalition aiming at
controlling emissions. In the rst stage, each country i of type j decides whether or
not to join the coalition, while in the second stage, emissions are chosen by all coun-
tries simultaneously. In addition, in the rst stage those countries that decide to join
the coalition agree to share the gains from cooperation among its members. Further-
more, we assume that once the agreement is signed, signatories acting as a unique
player, maximize the joint welfare, while non-signatories acting in a non-cooperative
way, maximize their own welfare. In particular, for each type j 2 fA;Bg a set of
countries Sj  N j signs an agreement to reduce the emissions of the global pollu-
tant and the remaining N jnSj do not. The game is solved by backward induction.
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Once emissions have been chosen and welfare levels have been realized, transfers are
implemented.
Following DAspremont et al. (1983), we dene a stable coalition as a coalition
which is both internally and externally stable. Stable agreements are those from
which no signatory country has incentives to leave (internal stability) and no country
outside the agreement has incentives to join (external stability), assuming that the
rest of the countries do not change their membership decision. Thus, the stability
conditions, for type A and B countries respectively, take the following forms:
internal stability conditions,
WAs (sA; sB)  WAns(sA   1; sB) and
WBs (sA; sB)  WBns(sA; sB   1); (2.5)
external stability conditions,
WAs (sA + 1; sB)  WAns(sA; sB) and
WBs (sA; sB + 1)  WBns(sA; sB); (2.6)
where sj = jSjj denotes the number of type j 2 fA;Bg countries that sign the
agreement, Wjs is the welfare of a signatory country and Wjns is the welfare of a
non-signatory country.
To explore the scope of cooperation when countries use transfers, we apply the
Potential Internal Stability (PIS) condition as dened in Eyckmans and Finus (2004).
This condition implies that the aggregate net benets of the coalition must exceed the
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aggregate of the outside net-benet options of all coalition members. Hence, countries
can redistribute payo¤s within the coalition such that the coalition is internally




sjWjs (sj; s j) 
X
j2fA;Bg
sjWjns(sj   1; s j): (2.7)
That is, the aggregate welfare of all coalition members should be at least larger
than the aggregate welfare they receive deciding to free-ride. In other words, the
above condition states that the sum of the internal stability conditions should be
non-negative.
It follows that the sum of the internal stability conditions in the case of transfers
is the sum of the internal stability conditions for the case without transfers, since















BTBs = 0. This leads to the following internal stability condition,
PIS(sA; sB) = sA[WAs (sA; sB) WAns(sA   1; sB)] +
sB[WBs (sA; sB) WBns(sA; sB   1)]  0: (2.8)
The option of transfers may allow coalition members to allocate their net benets
in such a way that a larger number of countries will have no incentives to leave the
coalition. Thus, there could be a self-nanced transfer T ji from the i cooperating
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countries of type j to the other non-cooperating countries that can successfully en-
large the original coalition. The potential internal stability is a su¢ cient condition
for internal stability in the presence of transfers, provided that transfers are opti-
mally designed. According to Eyckmans and Finus (2004), under an optimal transfer
scheme every coalition member receives at least its free-rider payo¤ and there may
be an extra share of the surplus PIS(sA; sB).
When transfers are used to increase cooperation, the stability conditions, for each
type of country, are modied as follows:
internal stability conditions,
WAs (sA; sB) + TAs (sA; sB)  WAns(sA   1; sB) and
WBs (sA; sB) + TBs (sA; sB)  WBns(sA; sB   1); (2.9)
external stability conditions,
WAs (sA + 1; sB) + TAs (sA + 1; sB)  WAns(sA; sB) and
WBs (sA; sB + 1) + TBs (sA; sB + 1)  WBns(sA; sB): (2.10)
In other words, internal stability holds when the welfare of a signatory country
net of the transfer, which could be positive or negative, is larger than its welfare
under the free-riding option. On the other hand, external stability holds when a
non-signatory countrys welfare exceeds the welfare it earns when it is part of the
agreement, taking into account the transfer payment.
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2.3 Choice of emissions
We solve the game using backward induction. Thus, once emissions have been
chosen and welfare levels have been realized, transfers are implemented to examine
their e¤ect on the game. Each signatory of type j emits ejs, such that Esj = s
jejs,
where sj = jSjj, and thus the coalitions total emissions are Es = EsA + EsB . Simi-
larly, each non-signatory of type j emits ejns, such that Ensj = (n
j   sj)ejns, yielding
aggregate emissions of non-signatories Ens = EnsA + EnsB . Therefore, global emis-
sions are given by,
E = Es + Ens = s
AeAs + s
BeBs + (n
A   sA)eAns + (nB   sB)eBns: (2.11)
Before we proceed to the solutions regarding countriesemissions and welfare lev-
els, we dene the following parameters in order to simplify the presentation. Namely,
parameter j indicates the relationship between environmental damages and benets













where c is the ratio of the slopes of the marginal environmental damages and b is the
ratio of the slopes of the marginal benets, of type A over type B countries.
Finally, we dene the expression 	,
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which can also be written as,
	 = 1+A(nA sA)+B(nB sB)+A(sA)2+B(sB)2+(Ac 1+Bc)sAsB: (2.15)
Note that 	 is always positive since sA  nA, sB  nB and j > 0.
The payo¤ function for each country i of type j, is given by equation (2.4).
Each country receives benets from its economic activity while it su¤ers damages
from global emissions. Signatories maximize the coalitions welfare given by Ws =P
j s
jW js , where j 2 fA;Bg, that is, Ws = sAWAs + sBWBs . Therefore, signatories

















where aggregate emissions E are given by equation (2.11).













Non-signatories choose their emissions ejns, by maximizing their own welfare given









where aggregate emissions E are given by equation (2.11).
The rst order conditions of the non-signatoriesmaximization problem (2.19)











Substituting the equilibrium values of the choice variables from (2.17), (2.18),





We continue by substituting the equilibrium values of the choice variables from
(2.17), (2.18), (2.20) and (2.21) into equation (2.4), to derive the indirect welfare
functions of signatories (WAs and WBs ) and non-signatories (WAns and WBns) for both
types of countries.
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2.4 Stable coalitions with transfers
Without permitting transfers, it has been shown in Chapter 1 that under hetero-
geneity the size of stable coalitions remains small and in some cases smaller than in
the case of homogeneity. That is, heterogeneity can exacerbate rather than reduce
free-riding incentives. In this section, we examine whether transfers can be used to
increase participation in an IEA.
We focus on internal stability and recall that potential internal stability is given
in condition (2.8). Substituting the values of the indirect welfare functions from


























where, as previously dened, b = b
A
bB
, c = c
A
cB
, j = c
j
bj
with j 2 fA;Bg, and 	 =
1 + A(nA   sA) + B(nB   sB) + A(sA)2 + B(sB)2 + (Ac 1 + Bc)sAsB.
2.4.1 Heterogeneity in environmental damages
In order to derive analytical results in Chapter 1, we restrict heterogeneity among
countries. In order to compare results, we make the same assumption, that is, coun-
tries are assumed to be heterogeneous in the environmental damages, while they have
the same benet function. Given that we have to restrict heterogeneity, the choice
of keeping heterogeneity of countries damages seems more appropriate since the
strongest part of countriesstrategic interactions is captured, in the model, through
global pollution. That is, we consider cA 6= cB while aA = aB = aI and bA = bB = bI .4
Furthermore, without any loss of generality, we assume that c > 1, implying that
cA > cB, and since b = b
A
bB
= 1, we have A > B. Therefore, in this context, type
A countries have a steeper marginal environmental damage function compared to
type B countries. That is, type A countries su¤er higher marginal environmental
damages at any level of global pollution, which implies that they are more sensitive
4The superscript I in parameters a and b, i.e. aI and bI , is used to denote that countries are
identical with respect to benets.
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to environmental pollution. For simplicity and without any loss of generality we set
nA = nB = n.
Under these assumptions, the PIS condition can be written as follows,




















Moreover, based on the above assumptions regarding the parameters, the expres-
sion 	 can be written as 	 = 1+A(n sA)+B(n sB)+A(sA)2+B(sB)2+ sAsB,
where   = A + B. Note that c = 
A
B
since b = 1.
Given the higher sensitivity of type A countries (c > 1), they benet from co-
operation that yields lower levels of global pollution and are willing to provide side
payments to less sensitive type B countries, in order to support a large stable coali-
tion. We are interested in nding the number of type A countries, i.e. sA, that sign
the agreement and agree to share the gains from cooperation as well as the maximum
number of type B countries, i.e. sB, that are lured into signing the agreement by
transfers at a level at least equal to their free-riding gains.
Assuming the same type of heterogeneity but without transfers, in the study pre-
sented in Chapter 1, we prove analytically that the largest possible stable coalition
that can be achieved includes only two countries and the membership of the coalition
is mainly driven by the degree of heterogeneity in environmental damages. In par-
ticular, there are three possible cases: a mixed coalition that includes one country
of each type, i.e. (sA = 1; sB = 1), when heterogeneity is small, a coalition with
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two type B countries, i.e. (sA = 0; sB = 2), when heterogeneity is moderate, and
a coalition with two type A countries, i.e. (sA = 2; sB = 0), when heterogeneity
is strong. Moreover, when heterogeneity exceeds a certain level, a stable non-trivial
coalition does not exist.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to derive analytical results when transfers are
introduced. Thus, we resort to simulations. The following Remark summarizes the
results obtained using simulations.
Remark 6 Allowing for transfers among heterogeneous countries increases cooper-
ation. However, the increase in the coalition size does not come from countries be-
longing to the most su¤ering type (type A). Only type B countries join the coalition
because of the transfers they receive.
It is evident that the introduction of transfers cannot not induce more type A
countries to cooperate, since these countries have to provide the necessary transfers
to type B countries. Thus, we can have a coalition with either sA = 1 or sA = 2 type
A signatories. For any sA  3 the internal stability condition for type A countries
(rst condition in (2.9)) is not satised. This result was expected since the need
to provide transfer payments exacerbates the existing free-riding incentives. The
number of type B countries that are willing to join the coalition, under the condition
that they receive transfers, varies depending on the degree of heterogeneity.
Our simulations demonstrate that as the degree of heterogeneity increases, the
size of the coalition under transfers increases as well. Without loss of generality we
set sB = n assuming that all type B countries participate in the agreement (because
of the transfers they receive) and we try to nd the degree of heterogeneity required to
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support coalitions of di¤erent sizes, i.e. either (sA = 1; sB = n) or (sA = 2; sB = n),
for any number of countries n  3.
Setting sB = n and rearranging terms, the PIS condition (2.28) can be written
as follows,




















Given the assumption, sB = n, the value of 	 can be written as 	 = 1+ A(n 
sA) + A(sA)2 + Bn2 +  sAn.
Condition (2.29) is satised, only if sA 2 f1; 2g while sB = n for any value of
n  3. Moreover, in all cases presented in our numerical analysis, if condition (2.29)
holds, meaning that an enlarged coalition is internally stable, the external stability
condition for type A countries (rst condition in (2.10)) holds as well.
In the following table, Table 2.1, we summarize all possible stable coalitions that
can be achieved for n 2 f3; 4; :::; 10g and sA 2 f1; 2g presenting the threshold values
of parameters A and B that support each one of them.5 Note that, as indicated
from the expression in (2.29), the relationship between A and B is not linear.
When, for instance, parameter B takes its maximum value, condition (2.29) species
the maximum value parameter A can take so that the corresponding coalition is
5Values are rounded o¤ so that they do not exceed their corresponding thresholds.
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stable. According to the analysis, a larger coalition requires stricter constraints for
the parameters of the model, i.e. A and B.
Table 2.1: Possible stable agreements
Agreement (1; n) Agreement (2; n)
n A  B  A  B 
3 8 0:0520 0:0429 4:85  10 4
4 1:6513 0:0133 0:0223 1:51  10 4
5 0:8216 0:0070 0:0138 6:19  10 5
6 0:5461 0:0044 0:0094 2:99  10 5
7 0:4087 0:0030 0:0068 1:62  10 5
8 0:3265 0:0022 0:0052 9:58  10 6
9 0:2718 0:0017 0:0041 6:01  10 6
10 0:2327 0:0013 0:0033 3:95  10 6
To visualize the results, we consider the two coalitions (1; 8) and (2; 8) and present
the corresponding regions, see Figure 2.1, in which the PIS condition (2.29) is sat-
ised respectively. The X axis shows the parameter A while the Y axis shows the
parameter B. The rst graph, Figure 2.1a, plots the region where the PIS condi-
tion is satised so that the agreement (1; 8) is stable (blue area), while the second
graph, Figure 2.1b, plots the region where the PIS condition is satised so that the
agreement (2; 8) is stable (blue area).6
Regarding coalition (1; 8), when parameter B takes its maximum value, i.e.
B = 0:0022, the corresponding maximum value that parameter A can take, based
6Note that the vertical and horizontal axisscales are di¤erent between the two gures.
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(a) Region where PIS  0, agreement (1; 8) (b) Region where PIS  0, agreement (2; 8)
Figure 2.1: Regions where PIS  0
on condition (2.29), so that the agreement is stable, is A = 0:1218: Similarly for the
coalition (2; 8), when parameter B takes its maximum value, i.e. B = 9:58  10 6,
the corresponding maximum value that parameter A can take, so that the agreement
is stable, is A = 2:63  10 3. Obviously, when the agreement (2; 8) is stable, the
agreement (1; 8) is stable as well since we need stricter constraints for the parameters
A and B in order to achieve a stable coalition that includes 2 instead of 1 type A
countries. We can present similar graphs for all cases displayed in Table 2.1. The
regions where the PIS condition is satised take always the same semi-oval form and
shrink as we move to larger stable agreements. This is also obvious by comparing
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the region where the agreement (1; 8) is stable, Figure 2.1a, to the region where the
agreement (2; 8) is stable, Figure 2.1b.
Taking the peak points of all curves, like the ones presented in Figure 2.1, for any
coalition size, we generate Table 2.2. The table includes the values of the parameters









given that bA = bB) for any possible stable coalition.8
Table 2.2: Stable agreements for di¤erent degrees of heterogeneity
Agreement (1; n) Agreement (2; n)
n A max B  A max B 
3 0:9999 0:0375 26:62 0:01989 4:85  10 4 40:97
4 0:4557 0:0133 34:13 0:01093 1:51  10 4 72:32
5 0:2719 0:0070 38:53 0:00679 6:19  10 5 109:65
6 0:1978 0:0044 44:85 0:00473 2:99  10 5 157:98
7 0:1468 0:0030 48:53 0:00341 1:62  10 5 209:84
8 0:1218 0:0022 55:24 0:00263 9:58  10 6 275:38
9 0:1071 0:0017 63:92 0:00208 6:01  10 6 347:24
10 0:0920 0:0013 69:65 0:00183 3:95  10 6 463:15
7Values are rounded o¤ so that they do not exceed their corresponding maximum points.
8Values are rounded to two decimal places.
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In all cases, the derived values for the parameters A and B satisfy the following
conditions, 0 < A < 1 and 0 < B < 1, except for the agreement (1; 3) where
parameter A takes a value higher than 1 when parameter B takes its maximum
value. Thus, for this coalition, we restrict A < 1 and so the corresponding maximum
value for B, based on condition (2.29), is B = 0:0375. The intuition of having
j < 1 is that the slope of the marginal environmental damages (cj) is smaller than
the slope of the marginal benets (bj). Therefore, the relative impact of damages
to benets is not very high. In the homogeneous case, the literature has shown that
a stable agreement exists, though small, only when the above-mentioned restriction
holds (i.e. the impact of damages to benets is low).
The analysis points out that larger coalitions require stricter constraints for the
parameters of the model and a stronger degree of heterogeneity (captured by the
parameter ). Thus, to increase cooperation we have to increase heterogeneity among
the two types of countries (higher value for the parameter ) while decreasing the
e¤ect of the global environmental damages on their welfare levels (lower values for
the parameters A and B).
Using the data from Table 2.2, we plot in Figure 2.2 the degree of heterogeneity
 (fourth and seventh columns) against the number of type B signatory countries
(rst column). We display two graphs for the two cases, (1; n) and (2; n) for n 2
f3; 4; :::; 10g. The X axis shows the number of type B signatory countries (i.e.
sB = n) and the Y axis shows the parameter . In particular, Figure 2.2a depicts
the results for the case with 1 type A signatory country and Figure 2.2b depicts the
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results for the case with 2 type A signatory countries. As indicated, the stronger the
degree of heterogeneity, the larger the coalition size.
(a) Stable agreements with 1 type A signatory
(b) Stable agreements with 2 type A signatories
Figure 2.2: Stable agreements for di¤erent degrees of heterogeneity
We can demonstrate the fact that larger coalitions are stable only when the degree
of heterogeneity increases, by choosing a specic value for the parameter A = 0:0015
and calculate the required degree of heterogeneity to support di¤erent sizes of a stable
agreement. Table 2.3 presents the degree of heterogeneity,  = A=B, required, by
the PIS condition (2.29), to support stable coalitions consisting of one or two type
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A countries (second and third column respectively) and n 2 f3; 4; :::; 10g type B
countries.9
Table 2.3: Stable agreements when A = 0:0015











The example clearly illustrates that the greater the heterogeneity, the greater the
cooperation incentives. For instance, in order to reach the stable agreement with
four type B countries and one type A country (1; 4); we need a relatively low level
of heterogeneity  = 6:85, but in order to have two type A signatories (2; 4), the
level of heterogeneity has to be  = 35:46. It is worth mentioning that, the degree of
heterogeneity required to sustain stable agreements with one type A country increases
9Parameter  is calculated by using the maximum value parameter B takes, given that A =
0:0015, so that the PIS condition (2.29) is satised. Values are rounded to two decimal places.
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at a smaller rate as the number of type B signatories increases, relative to the case
of agreements with two type A countries.
The above discussion is summarized in following Corollary.
Corollary 7 A higher degree of heterogeneity is required in order to achieve larger
stable agreements. The rate of the required increase in heterogeneity is higher if there
are two relative to only one type A signatories.
The above results extent to any number of countries. The maximum number
of type A countries that will join an agreement is two, regardless of their number.
Type A signatories, by o¤ering transfers, can attract into the agreement a large
number of type B countries, that is increasing with the degree of heterogeneity. In
what follows we extent the above results to a larger number of countries such that
n 2 f10; 20; :::; 100g.
Following the same process as before, we present in Table 2.4 the values of the
parameters A and B at the peak points of the corresponding curves.10 We include
also the parameter , i.e. the degree of heterogeneity necessary to support possible
stable coalitions such that sA 2 f1; 2g and n 2 f10; 20; :::; 100g.11 Comparing the
results presented in Table 2.4 with those displayed in Table 2.2, we observe that the
required degree of heterogeneity should be higher in order to induce cooperation of
a considerably larger number of type B countries.
10Values are rounded o¤ so that they do not exceed their corresponding maximum points.
11Values are rounded to two decimal places.
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Table 2.4: Larger stable agreements for di¤erent degrees of heterogeneity
Agreement (1; n) Agreement (2; n)
n A max B  A max B 
10 0:0920 1:32  10 3 69:65 1:83  10 3 3:95  10 6 463:15
20 0:0378 2:93  10 4 128:85 4:16  10 4 2:53  10 7 1; 647:26
30 0:0241 1:25  10 4 191:93 1:87  10 4 5:04  10 8 3; 705:38
40 0:0177 6:94  10 5 254:92 1:04  10 4 1:60  10 8 6; 473:00
50 0:0141 4:39  10 5 321:05 6:73  10 5 6:58  10 9 10; 221:68
60 0:0115 3:03  10 5 379:86 4:66  10 5 3:18  10 9 14; 661:68
70 0:0100 2:21  10 5 449:21 3:47  10 5 1:72  10 9 20; 197:90
80 0:0087 1:68  10 5 517:25 2:67  10 5 1:01  10 9 26; 519:84
90 0:0077 1:33  10 5 575:62 2:10  10 5 6:30  10 10 33; 392:52
100 0:0070 1:07  10 5 649:54 1:74  10 5 4:13  10 10 42; 104:80
In order to clearly demonstrate the requirement of increasing heterogeneity in
order to support larger coalitions, we choose a particular value for the parameter
A, that is A = 1:50  10 5, and calculate the value of the parameter  necessary
to support di¤erent coalition sizes.12 Table 2.5 presents the derived results of this
exercise.
Summarizing the above discussion, we rst nd that in order to achieve a larger
coalition, a higher degree of heterogeneity is required. Second, the degree of hetero-
geneity required to sustain stable agreements with one type A country increases at
12Parameter  is calculated by using the maximum value parameter B takes, given that A =
1:50  10 5, so that the PIS condition (2.29) is satised. Values are rounded to two decimal places.
69
Table 2.5: Larger stable agreements when A = 1:50  10 5
Agreement (1; n) Agreement (2; n)




30 69:70 1; 885:46
40 93:88 3; 463:97
50 118:08 5; 658:65
60 142:28 8; 630:26
70 166:50 12; 630:73
80 190:73 18; 066:61
90 214:97 25; 628:41
100 239:22 36; 578:32
a smaller rate as the number of type B signatories increases, relative to the case of
agreements with two type A countries.
2.4.2 Transfer rules
We now turn to the design of transfers. Under the optimal transfer rule every
coalition member receives at least his free-rider payo¤ plus a share of the remaining
surplus (Eyckmans and Finus, 2004). Therefore, no resources are wasted.















BBs = 1: (2.31)
Thus, shares can be di¤erent between the two types of countries, however, coun-
tries belonging to the same type receive an equal share. This rule is reasonable since
countries that benet from participating in the agreement can induce cooperation
without transferring all of their gains to those countries that require compensation
for their losses from joining the agreement.
The surplus is dened by the PIS condition in (2.8). Thus, each signatory country
receives a share js of the surplus,
PIS(sA; sB) = sA[WAs (sA; sB) WAns(sA   1; sB)] +
sB[WBs (sA; sB) WBns(sA; sB   1)]: (2.32)
Every type A coalition member receives nal welfare WAfinals (sA; sB),
WAfinals (sA; sB) =WAns(sA   1; sB) + As PIS(sA; sB); (2.33)
and every type B coalition member receives nal welfare WBfinals (sA; sB),
WBfinals (sA; sB) =WBns(sA; sB   1) + Bs PIS(sA; sB): (2.34)
Since type A countries benet from cooperation, they submit payments, while
type B countries receive payments. That is, we have welfare transfers from type
A to type B countries, meaning that the rst term inside the brackets in condition
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(2.32) is positive (internal stability is satised for type A countries) while the second
term is negative (internal stability is not satised for type B countries) for any
sA 2 f1; 2g and sB = n with n  3. According to the optimal transfer scheme, type
A countries should provide each type B signatory its free-rider payo¤ plus its share
of the surplus. Each type A country will also receive its free-rider payo¤ plus its
share of the surplus.
Hence, transfers from type A to type B countries take the following form,
Ts(s
A; sB) =WBns(sA; sB   1) WBs (sA; sB) + Bs PIS(sA; sB): (2.35)
At the extreme, type A countries could provide type B countries with just their
free-rider payo¤, without sharing the surplus. Thus, in this case, Bs = 0, transfers
are,
Ts(s
A; sB) =WBns(sA; sB   1) WBs (sA; sB): (2.36)
Given the above assumption regarding the transfer rule, the coalition members
welfare after the transfers, is dened in the following Remark.
Remark 8 After the transfers, the welfare level of type A coalition member is,




A; sB), and of type B coalition member is,
WBfinals (sA; sB) =WBs (sA; sB) + Ts(sA; sB):
72
2.5 Emissions and welfare levels





Setting aA = aB = aI , bA = bB = bI , nA = nB = n and sB = n, global emissions









Remark 9 Aggregate emissions decrease in the number of type A signatory countries
and in the value of the parameter j, where j 2 fA;Bg.
As expected, when sA = 2 aggregate emissions are lower relative to the case when
sA = 1. Moreover, a higher value for the parameter j implies that countries su¤er
more due to environmental damages and thus tend to emit less.
Proposition 10 With transfers, large stable agreements emit less. However, the
reduction in aggregate emissions achieved by the enlarged agreements is very small
relative to the case without transfers.
Proof. Under the coalition (sA = 1; sB = n), global emissions are,14
13The superscript I is used to denote that countries are identical with respect to benets.
14Global emissions are calculated using (2.38) and setting sA = 1.
73
E(sA = 1; sB = n) =
2aIn
1 + n2B + (  + A)n
: (2.39)
Under the coalition (sA = 2; sB = n), global emissions are,15
E(sA = 2; sB = n) =
2aIn
1 + n2B + (  + A)n+ 2A +  n
: (2.40)
Without transfers, as long as A and B satisfy the appropriate conditions (see
Section 1.4.2, Chapter 1), a stable agreement exists such that (sA = 2; sB = 0). In
this case, global emissions are,16
E(sA = 2; sB = 0) =
2aIn
1 +  n+ 2A
: (2.41)
Clearly, for n  2,
1 + n2B + (  + A)n+ 2A +  n > 1 + n2B + (  + A)n > 1 +  n+ 2A: (2.42)
Therefore,
E(sA = 2; sB = n) < E(sA = 1; sB = n) < E(sA = 2; sB = 0): (2.43)
15Global emissions are calculated using (2.38) and setting sA = 2.
16Global emissions are calculated using (2.22), restricting heterogeneity in environmental damages
and setting sA = 2 and sB = 0.
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Table 2.6 presents the global emissions (i.e. E) for the case where sA 2 f1; 2g
and n 2 f10; 20; :::; 100g.17 We x the values for the parameters aI , bI , A and B
such that aI = 1, bI = 25, A = 1:50  10 5 and B = 4:10  10 10. Given these
values for the parameters A and B, all the agreements presented in Table 2.4 are
stable. To facilitate comparison the last column of Table 2.6 presents aggregate
emissions in the case that no transfers are used and a stable agreement exists such
that (sA = 2; sB = 0).
Table 2.6: Global emissions
Transfers No Transfers
Agreement (1; n) Agreement (2; n) Agreement (2; 0)
n E E E
10 19:994 19:990 19:996
20 39:976 39:963 39:987
30 59:946 59:917 59:971
40 79:904 79:854 79:950
50 99:850 99:772 99:922
60 119:784 119:673 119:889
70 139:706 139:556 139:849
80 159:616 159:421 159:803
90 179:515 179:268 179:752
100 199:401 199:097 199:694
Comparing the second with the third column, it is evident that total emissions
are slightly lower with the large agreements (2; n) compared to the agreements (1; n)
17Values are rounded to three decimal places.
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for any corresponding number of n. Comparing the second and the third with the
fourth column, it is clear that total emissions are slightly higher in the case without
transfers, however, reductions are very small. Thus, even though the presence of
transfers increases cooperation, the reduction in aggregate emissions achieved by the
enlarged coalitions is very small and so the welfare improvement is also small. Table
2.7 includes the global welfare levels (i.e. WT ) for the cases presented above.18
Table 2.7: Global welfare levels
Transfers No Transfers
Agreement (1; n) Agreement (2; n) Agreement (2; 0)
n WT WT WT
10 249:250 249:251 249:250
20 494:007 494:011 494:004
30 729:785 729:804 729:769
40 952:112 952:170 952:058
50 1; 156:530 1; 156:670 1; 156:390
60 1; 338:570 1; 338:860 1; 338:290
70 1; 493:810 1; 494:350 1; 493:290
80 1; 617:820 1; 618:740 1; 616:930
90 1; 706:160 1; 707:630 1; 704:730
100 1; 754:440 1; 756:680 1; 752:260
The increase in the coalition size, relative to the case that transfers are not avail-
able, comes only from countries belonging to the type with the lower environmental
damages (i.e. type B countries), which are drawn into the coalition by the trans-
18Values are rounded to three decimal places.
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fers o¤ered. The number of coalition members belonging to the type su¤ering the
higher damages (i.e. type A countries) does not increase. Thus, the fact that stable
agreements consist of a few countries with high environmental damages and many
countries with low environmental damages, conrms the persistent result in the IEAs
literature that large stable coalitions are associated with low gains of cooperation.
2.6 Conclusions
The present paper examines the existence and stability of international environ-
mental coalitions in a two-stage, non-cooperative game among heterogeneous coun-
tries while allowing transfers. In particular, we introduce two types of countries
di¤ering in their sensitivity to the global pollutant. In order to introduce transfers,
the concept of the stability conditions, requiring that none of the coalitions mem-
bers wish to withdraw from and no country outside the coalition wishes to join the
coalition, needs to be modied. We do this by introducing the concept of potential
internal stability that allows coalition members to redistribute payo¤s among them
so that the coalition is internally stable.
We use the usual two-stage emission game where in the rst stage each country
decides whether or not to join the agreement, while in the second stage the quantity
of emissions is chosen simultaneously by all countries. In addition, in the rst stage
those countries that decide to join the agreement agree also to share the gains from
cooperation. We apply the following optimal transfer rule: type A countries give
every type B country, member of the coalition, his free-rider payo¤ and they share
the remaining gains among either all members or themselves.
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Our results show that allowing for transfers can increase cooperation among het-
erogeneous countries. Although the increase in the coalition size can be considerable,
the coalitions expansion is based only on countries of type B drawn into the coalition
by the incentive of the transfers o¤ered by countries of type A which su¤er the higher
environmental damages. Type A countriesfree-riding incentives are strong and thus
the coalition does not expand by including more of them. Since the coalition contains
more type B countries, that they do not have strong incentives to decrease emissions,
the reduction in aggregate emissions due to the enlargement of the coalition is small,
leading to dismal improvement in welfare.
Consequently, based on our analysis, using simulations, we can conclude that a
stable with transfers agreement can have either one or two type A countries and
any number n of type B countries. The level of cooperation that can be achieved
using transfers increases with the degree of heterogeneity, meaning that the higher
the heterogeneity in environmental damages, the higher the level of cooperation.
Furthermore, with transfers large stable coalitions can perform only slightly better
in terms of reductions in emissions.
2.7 Appendix
In what follows we present the proofs of Remarks 8 and 9.
Proof of Remark 8. Under the optimal transfer rule, every coalition member
receives at least his free-rider payo¤ plus a share of the remaining surplus. Based
on our analysis, type A countries should give each type B country - member of the
coalition - his free-rider payo¤. They will each receive also their free-rider payo¤s
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and then share the remaining gains among all members.
Recall that,
PIS(sA; sB) = sA[WAs (sA; sB) WAns(sA   1; sB)] +
sB[WBs (sA; sB) WBns(sA; sB   1)]  0: (2.44)
Transfers can take the following form,
Ts(s
A; sB) =WBns(sA; sB   1) WBs (sA; sB) + Bs PIS(sA; sB): (2.45)
The total transfers that should be paid to type B coalition members are,
T totals (s
A; sB) = sB
WBns(sA; sB   1) WBs (sA; sB) + Bs PIS(sA; sB)
=  sB WBs (sA; sB) WBns(sA; sB   1)+ (1  sAAs )PIS(sA; sB)
= sA
WAs (sA; sB) WAns(sA   1; sB)  sAAs PIS(sA; sB): (2.46)




=WAs (sA; sB) WAns(sA   1; sB)  As PIS(sA; sB): (2.47)
Therefore, the nal welfare for each type A country is,




= WAns(sA   1; sB) + As PIS(sA; sB): (2.48)
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Moreover, the nal welfare for each type B country is,
WBfinals (sA; sB) = WBs (sA; sB) + Ts(sA; sB)
= WBs (sA; sB) +WBns(sA; sB   1) WBs (sA; sB) + Bs PIS(sA; sB)
= WBns(sA; sB   1) + Bs PIS(sA; sB): (2.49)
In the extreme case where type A countries give every type B country only his
free-rider payo¤ without any share of the remaining surplus, parameters Bs should
be equal to zero, i.e. Bs = 0. Thus, transfers can be simplied as follows,
Ts(s
A; sB) =WBns(sA; sB   1) WBs (sA; sB): (2.50)
Since gains are distributed only among type A countries, As =
1
sA




AAs = 1. Hence, every type A coalition member receives nal welfare,




= WAs (sA; sB) +
sB
sA
WBs (sA; sB) WBns(sA; sB   1)





Every type B coalition member receives nal welfare,
WBfinals (sA; sB) = WBns(sA; sB   1)
= WBs (sA; sB) + Ts(sA; sB): (2.52)
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The derivative of the aggregate emissions with respect to the number of type A
signatory countries, i.e. sA, is negative meaning that global emissions decrease in
the number of type A signatory countries.
DsA =  2aIn
A(2sA   1) +  n
	2
: (2.54)
The derivative of the aggregate emissions with respect to the parameter A is
negative. When parameter A increases, type A countries su¤er more due to envi-
ronmental pollution and thus tend to emit less.
DA =  2aInn+ s
A(sA + n  1)
	2
: (2.55)
The derivative of the aggregate emissions with respect to the parameter B is
negative. When parameter B increases, type B countries su¤er more due to envi-








AND TRADING BLOCKS - CAN ISSUE LINKAGE
ENHANCE COOPERATION?
3.1 Introduction
The present chapter examines IEAs in an economy with trade.1 We extent the
basic (non-cooperative) model of the IEAsliterature with quadratic cost and benet
functions and simultaneous decisions by letting countries choose emission taxes and
import tari¤s as their policy instruments to manage climate change and control trade.
We consider the formation of a Global Agreement (GA) where countries (named sig-
natories) that form an environmental agreement form a free trade agreement as well.
Nations that remain outside of the agreement (named non-signatories) su¤er trade
costs. The advantage for the signatories is the tari¤-free access to other signatories
markets while at the same time they bare the burden of reducing emissions more. In
contrast, the disadvantage for the non-signatories is that they have to pay tari¤s on
their imports to any other country while free-riding on environmental e¤orts.
In this context, we dene the equilibrium of a three-stage emission game. In the
rst stage, each country decides whether or not to join the agreement. In the second
1This chapter is a joint work with my supervisor Dr. E¤rosyni Diamantoudi (Department of
Economics, Concordia University).
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stage, countries choose simultaneously - cooperatively or non-cooperatively - tari¤
and tax levels. In the third stage, each rm, taking the policies set by the countries
and the output decisions of the other rms as given, maximizes its prots. To obtain
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the model is solved by backward induction
and stability is determined by applying the internal and external stability conditions
(DAspremont et al., 1983) as well as the admissibility condition.
The main objective of the present study is to investigate the e¤ect of trade on
the stability and e¤ectiveness of environmental agreements, when all non-cooperative
countries and coalition members choose both their terms of trade and climate policy
instruments to deal with the environmental pollution. In particular, we are interested
in examining whether the presence of trade can enhance cooperation and improve
environmental performance as well as welfare relative to the basic model of the IEAs
literature.
Our analysis is mostly related to Eichner and Pethig (2015) in the sense that we
study IEAs in a model with symmetric countries, international trade, and emission
tax policy, however, they model a free trade world economy. To our knowledge, there
are no relevant studies that examine the formation of GAs in a framework similar to
ours. We believe that the existence of the two instruments (i.e. tari¤s and taxes),
even though adds complexity to the analysis, captures better the real-world situation
since trade and environmental problems a¤ect each other. Under the formation of a
GA, there are two important e¤ects that have to be taken into consideration. In an
IEA, the coalition formation creates positive externalities on non-participants. On
the other hand, in trade agreements, the coalition formation creates negative exter-
83
nalities on non-participants (Yi, 1997). The interaction between these two e¤ects is
essential to determine the stability and e¤ectiveness of an agreement.
Results are optimistic. Our ndings illustrate the importance of trade and envi-
ronmental policies working together to improve cooperation in e¤ective agreements.
Contrary to the IEA model, stable agreements are larger and more e¢ cient in reduc-
ing aggregate emissions and improving welfare. Moreover, the analysis shows that
the size of a stable agreement increases in the number of countries a¤ected by the
externalities. This result appears to contradict the main conclusion reached in the
IEAs literature stating that in a Cournot-IEA the maximum level of cooperation
consists of two members, independently of the number of countries. Clearly, if world
markets do not exist (autarky), the model coincides with the basic model of the
IEAsliterature.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3:2 describes the model.
Section 3:3 presents the benchmark case. Section 3:4 examines the formation of a
GA. Section 3:5 presents the stability conditions. Section 3:6 analyses numerically
the e¤ect of trade on the stability and e¤ectiveness of environmental agreements.
Section 3:7 concludes.
3.2 The model
We consider an open economy where countries trade with each other. We assume
that there are n identical countries, N = f1; 2; 3; :::; ng. The representative consumer













where eci is country is total consumption of the nonnumeraire good, Ki denotes the
numeraire good, and a and b are positive parameters, i.e. a > 0 and b > 0. The










where edi is country is consumption of the domestic product and e
I
ij indicates the
quantity country i imports from country j 6= i (i.e. quantity sold from country j to
country i).
The quasilinear utility function, given by equation (3.1), is su¢ cient to derive
country is inverse demand function for the nonnumeraire good, that is,
pi(e
c
i) = b(a  eci): (3.3)
The numeraire good is produced under perfect competition with constant returns
to scale and the nonnumeraire good is produced, in each country, by a single prot
maximizing rm. For simplicity, the marginal cost of production is assumed to be
constant and equal to zero. We consider that there is no pollution associated with
the numeraire good, while each unit of the nonnumeraire good produced generates
one unit of pollution emission.
Country i charges a non-negative tari¤ at the same rate of  i per unit of imports
from any country j, where j 6= i. Then country js e¤ective marginal cost of exporting
to country i is  i. Similarly, country is e¤ective marginal cost of exporting to
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country j is  j. We consider trade only in the good that generates emissions (i.e.
nonnumeraire good).
A by-product of production in this model is pollution. Pollution is perfectly
transboundary and thus a¤ects widely all countries. Country is production and as a
consequence polluting activity (recall the one-by-one relationship between production







That is, production in country i is the sum of what the country produces and
consumes domestically (i.e. edi ) and what the country produces domestically and
exports (i.e. eXij ).










where c > 0 is the pollution damage parameter, as well as Di (0) = 0, D0i  0
and D00i > 0. A convex environmental damage function implies that damages from
emissions increase at an increasing rate and so gradually reduce ecosystem services.
In other works, more emissions cause more harm on nature.
The environmental policy in country i is a carbon tax imposed per unit of emission
by the domestic rm due to its production. Given our assumption that each unit of
the polluting good produced generates one unit of pollution emission, a tax per unit
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of emission is equivalent to a tax per unit of the polluting good. The pollution (or
emission) tax set in country i is denoted by ti.
We model the process of countriesdecision as a non-cooperative three-stage emis-
sion game and start by solving the third stage where, taking countriesdecisions as
given, rms compete a la Cournot in the product markets. In the second stage, coun-
tries choose simultaneously - cooperatively or non-cooperatively - tari¤and tax levels
and in the rst stage, each country decides whether or not to join the agreement.
Firms problem
Each rm maximizes prots taking the policies set by the countries and the
output decisions of the other rms as given. The total prots for the rm i located
in country i consist of the prots of sales in the domestic market i plus the prots of









  tiepi : (3.6)
Firm i maximizes prots, given by equation (3.6), by choosing quantity sold in
country i, i.e. edi , and quantity sold in country j, i.e. e
X
ij , for all j 6= i 2 N . Given
that rm i has a zero marginal cost of producing the homogeneous good while its










j)   j)eXij   tiepi ; (3.7)
where ecj =
Pn
i=1 eji is country js total consumption of the nonnumeraire good.
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j)   j)eXij   tiepi ; 8j 6= i 2 N: (3.8)
Countrys problem
We assume that rmsprots and tari¤ and tax revenues are rebated back to
the consumers. So that, country is welfare, denoted by Wi, consists of the domestic
consumer surplus CSi, the domestic rms prots i (net of all taxes), the tari¤
revenues TRi, the tax revenues ERi and the environmental damages due to the
aggregate pollution level Di(E).2 That is,
Wi = CSi +i + TRi + ERi  Di(E): (3.9)





















where the quantity eXij indicates country is exports to country j while the quantity
eIij indicates countrys i imports from country j.
Country i maximizes welfare given by (3.10) by choosing tari¤ level  i and tax
level ti. Thus, its maximization problem is,
























3.3 The benchmark case
The non-cooperative outcome arises when each country i 2 N chooses its tari¤
and tax levels taking as given the tari¤ and tax levels from all the other countries,
playing Nash equilibrium.
From the rmsmaximization problem (3.8), the rst order condition with respect




eij   bedi   ti = 0: (3.12)





eji   beXij   ti    j = 0: (3.13)
Using the rst order conditions (3.12) and (3.13), we derive country is reaction
functions for the domestic product and the quantity exported in the benchmark case.
Thus,
3The quantity sold (exported) from country i to country j indicates also the quantity country j









ab  ti    j   bedj
nb
: (3.15)
Due to symmetry, the reaction function for the quantity exported from country
j to country i (i.e. eXji), that is the quantity imported to country i, is given by,
eIij =
ab  tj    i   bedi
nb
: (3.16)
Using the reaction functions, we derive the following expressions,
edi =












abn  ti   (n  1)tj   (n  1) i
(n+ 1)b
: (3.20)
















Before we proceed to the solutions, we dene parameter  as the ratio between





The rst order conditions for the welfare maximization yield two reaction func-
tions corresponding to the equilibrium  i and ti. Since countries are identical, the
tari¤ and pollution tax will be identical for all countries. Hence, imposing  i =  j
and ti = tj in country is reaction functions we solve for the Nash equilibrium tari¤
and tax. The reaction functions (after imposing  i =  j and ti = tj) are presented
in Appendix A.
Therefore, we have,
 i = ab
(2(2n  1) + 1)n2 + 3n  2
2(n+ 1)(3n+ (2n  1)n   2) ; (3.23)
ti = ab
(4(2n  1) + n  6)n+ 1
2(n+ 1)(3n+ (2n  1)n   2) : (3.24)
The domestic quantity is given by,
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edi = a
2((2n  3)n+ 1)n + (n+ 6)n  3
2(n+ 1)(3n+ (2n  1)n   2) : (3.25)




3n  2n(2n  1)   1
2(n+ 1)(3n+ (2n  1)n   2) : (3.26)






3n+ (2n  1)n   2 : (3.27)




3n+ (2n  1)n   2 : (3.28)
Given our assumption that each unit of the nonnumeraire good produced gener-
ates one unit of pollution emission, equation (3.28) represents the aggregate emissions
as well.
Countrys i welfare is given by,
Wi = a2b(2n  1)(4n  ((2n  5)n+ 2)n   3)
2(3n+ (2n  1)n   2)2 : (3.29)
4Imports are non-negative for all n > 0 and   3n 12n(2n 1) .
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The world market-clearing condition, which requires that global production of
the good to be equal to its global consumption, is satised.
3.4 Coalition formation
We consider that a set of countries signs an GA aiming at controlling emissions
and trade. We call those countries signatories, while the non-participants of the
agreement are called non-signatories. Signatories trade freely among themselves,
while non-signatories are penalized by a tari¤ on their imports to the members of the
agreement. Moreover, non-signatories pay a tari¤ when they export to other non-
signatories. Additionally, signatories choose a common tax level that internalizes
the full environmental cost of all coalition members while non-signatories choose
individually their emission tax.
In particular, we assume that a set of countries S  N signs a GA and the
remaining NnS do not. The countries that form an agreement of size s = jSj, act
cooperatively maximizing the joint welfare, while the countries that decide not to
participate act non-cooperatively maximizing their own welfare. Thus, there are s
signatory countries and (n   s) non-signatory countries. Taking advantage of the
symmetry assumption, we treat all signatory countries equally within the coalition.
3.4.1 Output levels
A signatory countrys total consumption of the nonnumeraire good is given by,
ecs = e
d
s + (s  1)eIss + (n  s)eIsns; (3.30)
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where eds is signatorys domestic product, e
I
ss indicates quantity imported from a
signatory country, and eIsns indicates quantity imported from a non-signatory country.




ns + (n  s  1)eInsns + seInss; (3.31)
where edns is non-signatorys domestic product, e
I
nsns indicates quantity imported
from a non-signatory country, and eInss indicates quantity imported from a signatory
country.
Using the rst order conditions (3.12) and (3.13) from the rms maximization
problem, we derive the domestic product and the quantities imported for each sig-
natory and non-signatory country respectively.








ab+ sts   (s+ 1)tns   (s+ 1) s
(n+ 1)b
: (3.33)
We restrict the parameter values so that imports are non-negative. That is,
ab  (s + 1)(tns +  s)   sts. If a signatory country raises its tari¤ on imports from
a non-signatory country, i.e.  s, then production (as well as consumption) of the
5The quantity a signatory country imports from a non-signatory country indicates also the quan-
tity a non-signatory country exports to a signatory country, that is eIsns = e
X
nss. Also, signatories




domestic good increases, imports from another signatory country increase as well,
while imports from a non-signatory country decrease. Similar e¤ects occur when
a non-signatory country increases its tax per unit of emission, i.e. tns. However,
an increase in a signatory countrys tax per unit of emission, i.e. ts, will cause a
decrease in domestic production and consumption, a decrease in imports from a
signatory country and an increase in imports from a non-signatory country.
To derive a signatory countrys total consumption of the nonnumeraire good, i.e.
ecs, we use equations (3.32) and (3.33). Therefore,
ecs =
abn  sts   (n  s)tns   (n  s) s
(n+ 1)b
: (3.34)
If a signatory country raises its tari¤ on imports from a non-signatory country,
i.e.  s, then its total consumption falls. An increase in either a signatory countrys
tax per unit of emission, i.e. ts, or a non-signatory countrys tax per unit of emission,
i.e. tns, will cause a decrease to its total consumption as well.
For a non-signatory, these quantities take the following forms,6
edns =




ab  (s+ 1)tns + sts   2ns
(n+ 1)b
; (3.36)
6The quantity a non-signatory country imports from a signatory country indicates also the
quantity a signatory country exports to a non-signatory country, that is eInss = e
X
sns. Also, non-





ab+ (n  s)tns   (n  s+ 1)ts   2ns
(n+ 1)b
: (3.37)
We restrict the parameter values so that imports are non-negative. That is,
ab  (s + 1)tns + 2ns   sts and ab  (n   s + 1)ts + 2ns   (n   s)tns. If a non-
signatory country raises its tari¤ on imports from another country, i.e. ns, then
production (as well as consumption) of the domestic good increases, while imports
decrease. An increase in a non-signatory countrys tax per unit of emission, i.e. tns,
will cause a reduction in domestic quantity and imports from another non-signatory
country but an increase in imports from a signatory country. The inverse e¤ect
occurs if a signatory countrys tax per unit of emission, i.e. ts, increases. That
is, domestic quantity and imports from another non-signatory country increase but
imports from a signatory country decrease.
Using equations (3.35), (3.36) and (3.37), we derive the total consumption of a
non-signatory country. That is,
ecns =
abn  (n  s)tns   sts   (n  1)ns
(n+ 1)b
: (3.38)
If a non-signatory country raises its tari¤ on imports, i.e. ns, then its total
consumption falls. An increase in either non-signatory countrys tax per unit of
emission, i.e. tns, or a signatory countrys tax per unit of emission, i.e. ts, will cause
a decrease to its total consumption as well.
A signatory countrys net imports are,
(n  s)(eIsns   eXsns) =  (n  s)




A non-signatory countrys net imports are,
s(eInss   eXnss) = s
(n+ 1)tns   (n+ 1)ts   2ns + (s+ 1) s
(n+ 1)b
: (3.40)
Thus, global net imports sum to zero clearing the markets. That is,
s(n  s)(eIsns   eXsns) + (n  s)s(eInss   eXnss) = 0: (3.41)
Using equations (3.34) and (3.38), we derive the aggregate consumption level
which is equal to the aggregate production level (due to the world market-clearing
condition). That is,
E = s
abn  sts   (n  s)tns   (n  s) s
(n+ 1)b






abn2   nsts   n(n  s)tns   s(n  s) s   (n  1)(n  s)ns
(n+ 1)b
: (3.43)
Given our assumption that each unit of the nonnumeraire good produced gener-
ates one unit of pollution emission, equation (3.43) represents the aggregate emissions
as well. We observe that aggregate emissions decrease when the tari¤ and tax levels
set by either signatories or non-signatories or both parties increase.
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3.4.2 Tari¤ and tax levels
Under the formation of a GA of size s = jSj, signatories abolish tari¤s among
themselves and jointly choose their external tari¤ (i.e. tari¤ to the non-signatories)
and tax level to maximize the aggregate welfare of the members. On the other hand,
non-signatories choose their tari¤ and emission tax to maximize their own welfare.
Signatories maximize the aggregate coalition welfare
P
i2SWi = sWs with respect




0B@ 12b (ecs)2 + sps(ecs)eds + (n  s)(pns(ecns)  ns)eXsns+
(n  s) seIsns   12cE2
1CA : (3.44)
Note that a signatorys prots from exporting to other signatories are equal to its
domestic prots since eds = e
X
ss as per equation (3.32). Moreover, it receives prots
from exporting to the non-signatories after taking into account the export related
costs. There are also tari¤ revenues per unit of imports from the non-signatories.
The rst order conditions for the welfare maximization yield two reaction func-
tions. The signatories reaction function for the equilibrium tari¤  s(ts; ns; tns)
which is a function of signatoriestax ts, non-signatoriestari¤ ns, non-signatories
tax tns, and the other parameters in the model. The signatoriesreaction function
for the equilibrium tax ts( s; ns; tns) which is a function of signatories tari¤  s,
non-signatoriestari¤ ns, non-signatoriestax tns, and the other parameters in the
model. The corresponding second order conditions for the welfare maximization
problem are satised (see Appendix B).
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Non-signatories maximize their own welfare Wns with respect to ns and tns.




0B@ 12b (ecns)2 + pns(ecns)edns + (n  s  1)pns(ecns)eXnsns+
s(ps(e
c
s)   s)eXnss + snseInss   12cE2
1CA : (3.45)
A non-signatorys prots from exporting to other non-signatories are di¤erent
from its domestic prots since edns 6= eXnsns as per equations (3.35) and (3.36). Notice
that the costs related to those exports are equal to the tari¤ revenues from the other
non-signatoriesimports since they all exchange an equal quantity among themselves.
Additionally, it receives prots from exporting to the signatories after taking into
account the export costs. There are also tari¤ revenues per unit of imports from the
signatories.
The rst order conditions for the welfare maximization yield two reaction func-
tions. The non-signatoriesreaction function for the equilibrium tari¤ ns(tns;  s; ts)
which is a function of non-signatoriestax tns, signatoriestari¤  s, signatoriestax
ts, and the other parameters in the model. The non-signatoriesreaction function for
the equilibrium tax tns(ns;  s; ts) which is a function of non-signatoriestari¤ ns,
signatories tari¤  s, signatories tax ts, and the other parameters in the model.
The corresponding second order conditions for the welfare maximization problem
are satised (see Appendix B).
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The reaction functions for the tari¤,  s and ns, and tax, ts and tns, levels are
presented in Appendix C. Moreover, the equilibrium levels of tari¤s and taxes are
presented in Appendix D due to the length of their expressions.
3.4.3 Full cooperation case
In the full cooperation case, countries abolish tari¤s and jointly choose their tax
level to maximize the aggregate welfare. Under the full cooperation assumption,
tari¤s are eliminated from our analysis and all countries choose the tax tc that
maximizes aggregate welfare. In this case, the model is simplied to the basic full
cooperation model (socially optimal outcome) of the IEAsliterature. As a result





The quantities produced and traded are all equal and thus total quantity con-




















The derived solutions for the total emissions and welfare are equivalent to the
solutions presented in Rubio and Casino (2001) where they calculate the full coop-
erative level of emissions and net benets of each country in the IEA model.7
3.5 The stability of an agreement
In the IEAsliterature, the existence and stability of an environmental agreement
is determined using the notions of internal and external stability as was originally
developed by DAspremont et. al (1983) and extended to IEAs by Carraro and
Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett (1994). Internal stability implies that no coalition
member has an incentive to leave the coalition, while external stability implies that
no country outside the coalition has an incentive to join the coalition, assuming that
the remaining players in the game do not revise their membership decision. We
denote the size of a stable agreement by s.
Formally, the internal and external stability conditions take the following forms:
internal stability condition,
Ws(s)  Wns(s   1); (3.50)
7In our model, a representative consumer in country i has a utility function of the form
Ui(e
c
i ;Ki) = b

aeci   12 (eci )2

+ Ki while Rubio and Casino (2001) assume that the quadratic
benet function for each country takes the form, Bi(qi) = aqi  b2q2i , where qi denotes emissions by
country i, a > 0 and b > 0. It is trivial to derive the equivalence between the parameters.
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external stability condition,
Wns(s)  Ws(s + 1); (3.51)
where Ws is the welfare of a signatory country and Wns is the welfare of a non-
signatory country.
The present model examines the formation of IEAs in an economy with trade.
Therefore, we have to take into consideration two e¤ects. The rst e¤ect, referred to
as environmental e¤ect, is related to the pure public good provision problem. Since
environment is a global public good, countries have strong free-riding incentives
especially when compliance with an IEA is costly to them. That is, the coalition
formation generates positive externalities on non-participants. Thus, a free-rider
country, acting in a self-interest manner, can increase its own emissions and enjoy
the benets from the overall pollution reduction brought about by the coalition. In
terms of stability, non-signatoriesstrong free-riding incentives imply a violation of
the internal stability condition (3.50).
The second e¤ect is related to the presence of trade and henceforth referred to as
trade e¤ect. In trade agreements, the coalition formation generates negative exter-
nalities on non-participants reducing their welfare (Yi, 1997). Thus, trade measures
can be a key factor in increasing cooperation incentives. The intuition is that, if
non-signatories expect trade barriers, they may have incentives to join IEAs. In this
case, the external stability condition (3.51) is violated.
Even though in IEAs, members cannot exclude non-members from enjoying the
benets of a better global environment, in trade agreements, non-members can be
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excluded from enjoying the benets of free trade. Free trade is not treated as a global
public good, thus, when non-signatories express interest to cooperate (i.e. condition
(3.51) is violated), they will not be admitted to the agreement if this action makes
the existing members worse o¤. To that extent, we add one more condition, called
admissibility condition. The admissibility condition takes the following form,
Ws(s) >Ws(s + 1); (3.52)
and implies that even if external stability is violated and non-signatories wish to join,
signatories oppose to the enlargement.
Considering the trade aspect in isolation, suppose that an agreement consisting
of n  1 signatory countries is internally but not externally stable. That is, the last
country has strong incentives to join the agreement as well. If the existing members
admit the last country as a new member, they will gain tari¤-free access to one new
member country, but they grant the new member tari¤-free access to n 1 countries.
The new member must be better o¤, however, there is no guarantee that the existing
members become better o¤ (Yi, 1996). The admissibility condition is needed to
ensure that existing members will admit a new member if they become better o¤ by
expanding the coalition.
In this context, stability is dened as follows:
Denition 11 A GA of size s is stable if either,
(i) Ws(s)  Wns(s   1) and Wns(s)  Ws(s + 1) or,
(ii) Ws(s)  Wns(s   1), Wns(s) <Ws(s + 1) and Ws(s) >Ws(s + 1):
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Furthermore, we want to point out that there is an important di¤erence between
environmental and trade agreements. In environmental agreements, countries can
freely enjoy the benets of a better environment free-riding on others e¤orts. Also,
they can promote environmental quality by reducing their emissions without nec-
essarily belonging to an agreement. However, in trade agreements, countries can
benet from free trade only if they are members of the agreement (i.e. benets are
excludable).
Solving analytically for the stability conditions under the two policies, i.e. tari¤s
and emission taxes, has proven impossible thus far.
3.6 Numerical analysis
In this section, we demonstrate a numerical analysis to study the model and
to provide further intuitions. We are interested in examining the e¤ect of trade
on the stability and e¤ectiveness of environmental agreements. Therefore, we focus
on studying whether the formation of a GA can increase participation incentives,
decrease global emissions and improve welfare relative to the corresponding outcomes
of the basic model of the IEAsliterature.
3.6.1 The e¤ect of trade on stability for n = 10
We use the following baseline parameter values: n = 10, a = 1, b = 1 and
 = 0:045.8 Recall that parameter  measures the impact of environmental damages
8Note that  = 0:045 fails to satisfy the constraint (3.69) since  > 0:0433. That is, in the IEA
model the outcome is the global non-cooperation case, instead of the typical coalition of size 2.
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to benets due to emissions. In the IEA model, a stable agreement exists, though
small, if that impact is low enough.9 In the present analysis, we set a parameter value
such that environmental damages have a more important e¤ect on countrieswelfare.
Therefore, environmental pollution matters and countries apply strong enough en-
vironmental policies (emission taxes) to ght climate change: That is, we limit the
range of the values of the parameter  so that we generate interior equilibrium values
for taxes for most coalition sizes. When the coalition size is expanded considerably,
the equilibrium taxes of the non-signatories take a corner solution. In the present
analysis, given that n = 10, a = 1 and b = 1, equilibrium taxes are mainly positive
for   0:0415. For that reason we choose  = 0:045. Moreover, working with
parameters that in the IEA model generates no stable coalition only strengthens our
hypothesis that trade enhances cooperation.
Table 3.1 presents the production levels, net imports and consumption levels
for each signatory and non-signatory country respectively.10 The production and
consumption levels for a signatory are given by the following equations, eps = e
d
s +
(s   1)eXss + (n   s)eXsns and ecs = eds + (s   1)eIss + (n   s)eIsns. On the other hand,
the production and consumption levels for a non-signatory are given by the following
equations, epns = e
d
ns+(n  s 1)eXnsns+ seXnss and ecns = edns+(n  s 1)eInsns+ seInss.
The net imports for a signatory are equal to (n   s)(eIsns   eXsns) while net imports
for a non-signatory are equal to s(eInss   eXnss).11
9Parameter  should satisfy the constraint (3.69).
10Values are rounded to four decimal places.








Table 3.1: Production, consumption and trade activities
Signatory Country Non-signatory Country
s Production Net Consumption Production Net Consumption
Imports Imports
1       0:5198   0:5198
2 1:3913  0:7251 0:6661 0:4591 0:1813 0:6404
3 0:6643  0:0213 0:6430 0:6246 0:0091 0:6337
4 0:5793   0:5793 0:6642   0:6642
5 0:5007   0:5007 0:7043   0:7043
6 0:4225   0:4225 0:7314   0:7314
7 0:3647   0:3647 0:6657   0:6657
8 0:3094   0:3094 0:5726   0:5726
9 0:2511   0:2511 0:5000   0:5000
10 0:1818   0:1818      
The analysis shows that trade between signatories and non-signatories takes place
only for small coalitions such that s = 2 and s = 3. In particular, signatories export
while non-signatories import. For larger coalitions, net imports are zero (i.e. eIsns = 0
and eInss = 0), however, trade still takes place but only among coalition members
(i.e. eIss > 0) and among non-members (i.e. e
I
nsns > 0).
Notice that, when members and non-members engage in trade activities, signa-
tories report higher production and consumption levels. That is, the trade e¤ect
prevails. The inverse holds when they stop exchanging goods. In that case, signato-
ries, controlled by the environmental policy, tend to gradually reduce their polluting
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activities.12 However, non-signatories due to free-riding incentives increase theirs.
For coalitions with size s > 6 we observe a decrease in non-signatoriesproduction
and consumption levels. The intuition is as follows: even though non-signatories
increase the quantity they produce and consume domestically (i.e. edns) the total vol-
ume of trade among them gradually decreases since there are less countries outside
the agreement.
Figure 3.1 displays the aggregate emissions, i.e. E (solid line). Additionally, we
include in the graph the global emissions (dashed line) of the IEA model under the
non-cooperative case i.e. Enc = 6:8966.13
Figure 3.1: Aggregate emissions
12Signatories set a tax level that internalizes the full environmental cost of all coalition members.
Thus, the larger is the coalition, the higher will be the emission tax.
13Global emissions in the non-cooperative case are calculated using equations (3.70).
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Note that the dashed line does not denote the level of emissions per coalition,
it denotes only the benchmark Nash equilibrium case. Results show that aggregate
emissions decrease as we move to larger coalitions. Clearly, the environmental policy
incites signatories to reduce signicant their polluting activities. Moreover, as indi-
cated in the graph, aggregate emissions in the GA model are lower than aggregate
emissions in the IEA model. That is, the formation of a GA agreement can signi-
cantly improve on the basic model of the IEAsliterature in terms of environmental
performance, especially when the coalition size increases.
The following Remark summarizes the aforementioned results.
Remark 12 Regardless of stability, the interaction between trade and environment
policies is essential to improve environmental protection.
The following table, Table 3.2, presents the total welfare for each signatory
country, i.e. Ws, and non-signatory, i.e. Wns, country respectively, for any coali-
tion size s. Additionally, we include in the table the global welfare dened by
WT = sWs + (n   s)Wns.14 When trade between signatories and non-signatories
is present, the former are better o¤ than the latter. Specically, signatories receive
higher welfare than non-signatories for coalitions with size s = 2 and s = 3. For those
coalitions, the trade e¤ect dominates the environmental e¤ect. On the other hand,
in the absence of trade, non-signatories become better o¤. Due to free-riding incen-
tives, they report higher economic (polluting) activities than the coalition members
14Values are rounded to four decimal places.
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receiving higher welfare. We want to point out that in trade agreements, the welfare
of the non-signatories decreases in the size of the coalition (Yi, 1996). Moreover,
notice that the expansion of the agreement improves the global welfare. That is, the
global welfare is maximized under the grand coalition.15
Table 3.2: Welfare levels
s Ws Wns WT
1    0:2233  2:2329
2  0:4270  0:5188  5:0046
3  0:4721  0:4799  4:7759
4  0:4821  0:4501  4:6289
5  0:4414  0:3605  4:0096
6  0:3376  0:2069  2:8536
7  0:1676  0:0217  1:2385
8  0:0334 0:1138  0:0395
9 0:0482 0:2036 0:6375
10 0:0909   0:9091
Remark 13 Regardless of stability, the formation of GA improves welfare relative
to the basic model of the IEAsliterature.
Figure 3.2 depicts countrieswelfare and is used to illustrate the e¤ect of trade
on stability. The welfare for the signatories, i.e. Ws(s), is depicted by the solid
line and the welfare for the non-signatories, i.e. Wns(s), is depicted by the dot-
dashed line. Moreover, the welfare Wns(s   1) is depicted by the dotted line and
15In the non-cooperative case of the IEA model, each country receives welfare Wnc =  0:6183
(calculated using equation (3.71)). The global welfare is WncT =  6:1831.
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represents the welfare for the non-signatories shifted by one. We use such line to
represent graphically the internal stability condition as the vertical distance captures
Ws(s) QWns(s  1).
Figure 3.2: Welfare levels, n = 10
Signatories receive higher welfare than non-signatories when the trade e¤ect pre-
vails (the solid line is above the dot-dashed line), while the inverse holds when the
environmental e¤ect prevails (the dot-dashed line is above the solid line). The wel-
fare level of non-members increases in the size of the coalition, that is, starting from
the coalition of size two and gradually expanding the agreement makes non-members
better o¤. The welfare level of members increases also in the size of the coalition but
only for s > 4. As long as the trade a¤ect prevails, global emissions are still high
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and as a consequence high environmental damages a¤ect their welfare. For larger
coalitions (s > 4) we observe a signicant decrease in global emission level and thus
the expansion of the agreement makes members better o¤.
As indicated in the graph, a stable agreement is achieved at s = 7. The agree-
ment with seven countries is stable according to Denition: part (i), meaning that
none of its participating countries has an incentive to withdraw (internal stability)
and none of the non-participating countries has an incentive to further participate
(external stability). To put it di¤erently, at s = 7, the solid line in above the dotted
line (i.e. Ws(7) > Wns(6)). Therefore, internal stability is satised. Additionally,
s = 7 is externally stable (i.e. Wns(7) > Ws(8)) since the dotted line is above the
solid line.
There exists also a small coalition that is also stable (Denition: part (i)) at s = 3
for the same reasoning as previously mentioned. However, it is important to note
that the coalition s = 3 is not protable since the welfare of the signatory countries
is smaller than their welfare in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium (Carraro and
Siniscalco, 1993). Furthermore, note that the coalitions with sizes s = 5 and s = 6 fail
to satisfy stability because they violate Denition: part (i) and (ii). Specically, at
those coalitions even though the internal stability is satised, the external stability is
violated and also the admissibility condition is violated as well since Ws(5) <Ws(6)
and Ws(6) < Ws(7) respectively. Hence, coalition members become better o¤ by
expanding the coalition.
The following Remark summarizes our ndings.
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Remark 14 The size of a stable coalition increases when trade policies are included
in the formation of an environmental agreement. Emissions are signicantly lower
and welfare higher at the stable coalition when compared to the corresponding out-
comes of the IEA model.
It is worth mentioning that by choosing a very low value for the parameter 
(for example  = 0:004), such that emission taxes for non-signatories take a corner
solution for any coalition size, we get similar results with Yi (1996) who examines
the formation of customs unions.16 The intuition of setting a very low value for
the parameter  is that environmental damages are not so severe for the countries
and thus the environmental e¤ect almost disappears from our model while the trade
e¤ect becomes very strong. In this case non-members have strong incentives to
participate in a GA and benet from free trade (i.e. external stability condition (3.51)
is violated). However, admitting non-members to the agreement makes existing
member worse o¤. The admissibility condition (3.52) holds for any coalition size
greater than two. Thus, a stable coalition cannot have more than two members
(Denition: part (ii)). Yi (1996) shows that the number of equilibrium customs
unions in an unanimous regionalism game (a game where a customs union allows
entry of a new member if and only if all existing members agree to admit the new
member) is not greater than two.
16In his model the representative consumer in country i has a utility function similar to ours (as-
suming homogeneous goods). There are no environmental damages since he examines the formation
of customs unions when countries trade with each other choosing their tari¤ levels.
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3.6.2 The e¤ect of trade on stability for larger n
In order to provide further implications of our study, we present two indicative
examples with di¤erent parameter values and examine their e¤ect on the derived
results. In both cases, we use a graph, similar to the one presented in Figure 3.2, to
illustrate how trade a¤ects the stability of an agreement. We plot the welfare for the
signatoriesWs(s) (solid line), the welfare for the non-signatories Wns(s) (dot-dashed
line) and the welfare Wns(s  1) (dotted line).
In the rst numerical exercise, Example 1, we set n = 15, a = 1, b = 1 and
 = 0:025.17 The welfare levels are presented in Figure 3.3. Trade between signatories
and non-signatories takes place for coalitions with size s = f2; 3; 4g. In particular, the
former export while the latter import. For those coalitions, members receive higher
welfare than non-members (the solid line is above the dot-dashed line). For larger
coalitions, such that s > 4, non-members become better o¤ (the dot-dashed line is
above the solid line). In this case, a stable agreement exists at s = 11 (Denition:
part (i)). As indicated in the graph, at s = 11, the solid line in above the dotted
line (i.e. Ws(11) >Wns(10)). Thus, internal stability is satised. Moreover, s = 11
is externally stable (i.e. Wns(7) > Ws(8)) since the dotted line is above the solid
line. There exists also a small coalition (Denition: part (i)) that is internally and
externally stable at s = 5, however, it is not protable.
17Given that n = 15, a = 1 and b = 1, equilibrium taxes are mainly positive for   0:0216.
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Figure 3.3: Welfare levels, n = 15
Example 2, presents the case where n = 20, a = 1, b = 1 and  = 0:015.18 Figure
3.4 illustrates the welfare levels. Signatories and non-signatories engage in trade
activities for coalitions with size s = f2; 3; 4; 5g. In particular, the former export
while the latter import. For those coalitions, members receive higher welfare than
non-members. For larger coalitions such that s > 5, non-members become better o¤.
In this case, a stable agreement is achieved at s = 14 (Denition: part (i)). There
exists also a small coalition (Denition: part (i)) that is internally and externally
stable at s = 6, however, it is not protable.
18Given that n = 20, a = 1 and b = 1, equilibrium taxes are mainly positive for   0:013.
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Figure 3.4: Welfare levels, n = 20
When we increase the number of countries (i.e. n), setting parameter values (i.e.
) such that environmental pollution is important for them and so they take the nec-
essary environmental policies to ght climate change, we nd that the size of a stable
agreement increases as well.19 This result appears to contradict the main conclusion
reached in the IEAs literature stating that in a Cournot-IEA the maximum level
of cooperation consists of two members, independently of the number of countries.
However, the close to 70% participation seems to be quite robust against changes in
n when other parameters are kept same.
19There are interior equilibrium values for taxes for most coalition sizes.
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To summarize, results illustrate that trade along with environmental policies have
an important impact on the stability and e¤ectiveness of IEAs.
3.7 Conclusions
There has been considerable debate on the extent to which trade and environmen-
tal problems a¤ect each other. Clearly, trade measures a¤ect countriesproduction
and consumption activities. Therefore, if these activities a¤ect the environmental
quality, trade will a¤ect the environment. Similarly, environmental policies aiming
to protect countriesenvironment inuence the volume of trade.
The present paper examines the formation and stability of GAs. We extent the
basic model of the IEAsliterature by letting homogeneous countries apply policy
instruments such as emission taxes and tari¤s in order to tackle the climate change
problem and control trade. In this framework, countries are either members of a
GA or outsiders. Each member (signatory country) has tari¤-free access to other
membersmarkets. On the other hand, each non-member (non-signatory country)
pays tari¤s on its imports to the other countries.
Results are optimistic when the IEA model is extended to incorporate trade.
That is, the formation of an environmental agreement can be more successful when
environmental policies are linked with trade policies. Countries have stronger in-
centives to cooperate and take the necessary measures to protect the environment.
Thus, we can achieve larger stable agreements that reduce substantially aggregate
emissions and improve welfare. Moreover, the analysis illustrates that the size of a
stable agreement increases in the number of countries a¤ected by the externalities.
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The main limitation of our study is that the robustness of the derived results is not
clear because analytical complexity requires resorting to numerical calculations.
To sum up, trade measures in IEAs can be an e¤ective tool. Put in other words,
the recommendation that stems out of this paper is that countries should not negoti-
ate over environmental issues only. Rather, they should negotiate global agreements
over at least two issues. The main concern is that trade policies applied in environ-
mental agreements should be always compatible with the rules of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and its non-discrimination principle known as most favoured
nation treatment, which requires countries to grant equivalent treatment to the
same products imported from any WTO member country (General Agreement on
Tari¤s and Trade (GATT)).
3.8 Appendices
3.8.1 Appendix A
Recall that, we dene parameter  as the ratio between environmental damages





The reaction function for the equilibrium tari¤  i (after imposing  i =  j and
ti = tj) is given by,
 i =
ab(n2 + 3) + (n  2  n2)ti
n+ 7 + (n  1)n : (3.54)
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The reaction function for the equilibrium tax ti (after imposing  i =  j and
ti = tj) is given by,
ti =
ab(n3 + (n  6)n+ 4)  (n  1)(n2 + 2n  9) i
(4n  5)n+ 2 + n3 : (3.55)
3.8.2 Appendix B
The second order condition for the signatorieswelfare maximization problem
with respect to the tari¤  s is satised,
@2(sWs)
@ 2s




The second order condition for the signatorieswelfare maximization problem
with respect to the tax ts is satised,
@2(sWs)
@t2s




The second order condition for the non-signatorieswelfare maximization problem
with respect to the tari¤ ns is satised,
@2Wns
@ 2ns




The second order condition for the non-signatorieswelfare maximization problem
with respect to the tax tns is satised,
@2Ws
@t2ns





The reaction function for the signatoriesequilibrium tari¤  s(ts; ns; tns) is given
by,
 s(ts; ns; tns) =
0B@ ab(1 + (2 + n2)s)  ((n  s)ns   ((n  2(s+ 1))s  1))tns
 ((n   2)s  1)sts   (n  1)(n  s)sns
1CA
(n  s)s2 + (2s+ 3)s+ n+ 2 :
(3.60)
The reaction function for the signatoriesequilibrium tax ts( s; ns; tns) is given
by,
ts( s; ns; tns) =
0B@ abn(n+ 1  (1 + n2)s) + (n  s)((n2s+ n  s+ (n  2s)n)tns
+((n  1)ns   2(n+ 1  2s))ns   ((2  n)s+ 1)s s)
1CA
((2n+ 1)s  2(n+ 1)n  n2s)s :
(3.61)
The reaction function for the non-signatoriesequilibrium tari¤ ns(tns;  s; ts) is
given by,
ns(tns;  s; ts) =
0B@ ab((n  1)(n2   1) + 4s)  (n  s)((n  1)(1 + n)  4s)tns
 (3n+ 1  4s+ (n  1)n)sts   (n  1)(n  s)s s
1CA
(n  1)2((n  s) + 1) + 8s :
(3.62)
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The reaction function for the non-signatories equilibrium tax tns(ns;  s; ts) is
given by,
tns(ns;  s; ts) =
0BBBB@
abn(s+ 1)(n(n  s)   1) + ((n(n  2s)  s)  (n  s)(s+ 1)n)sts
 (n  s)(n  1  4s+ (n  1)(n  s)(s+ 1))ns
 (s+ 1)(n  1  2s+ (n  s)2)s s
1CCCCA
(n  s)((n  s)(s+ 1)n + n+ (2n+ 1)s) :
(3.63)
3.8.4 Appendix D
The equilibrium levels of the tari¤s,  s and ns, for a signatory and non-signatory








where the expression A is given by,
A = ab((s+ 1)n
5 + ( s2 + 2s+ 3)n4   (2s2 + s  3)n3   (s3   4s2 + 4s  1)n2 +
2( 3s2 +5s+1)sn  3(3s+1)s2 + (sn7 +(5s+1)n6 +( 12s2 +3s+1)n5 +(12s3 
11s2 +2s  1)n4 +(8s4 + s3  29s2  4s  1)n3 +( 5s4 +34s3 +53s2 +13s+1)sn2 
(14s3 + 22s2 + 11s+ 1)s2n+ (3s2 + 4s+ 1)s3));
the expression B is given by,
B = ab(s(2n
4 + (s2   s+ 6)n3 + ( s3 + 6s2 + 5)n2 + ( 5s3 + 6s2 + 6s+ 3)n 
(6s2 +5s+1)s) + (n7 +2(s2 + s+2)n6 + ( 7s3  5s2 + s+5)n5 + (4s4 + s3  7s2 
4s + 2)n4 + (4s4   2s3   11s2   18s   8)sn3 + ( 2s5 + 13s4 + 37s3 + 37s2 + 8s  
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1)sn2   (5s3 + 19s2 + 20s+ 4)s3n+ (3s2 + 4s+ 1)s4));
the expression D is given by,
D = (n7+(3s2+3s+4)n6+( 5s3+2s+5)n5+(s4 17s3 25s2 13s+2)n4+
(8s4 +18s3 +28s2 +11s  8)sn3 +( 8s4 +23s3 +17s2 +6s+12)s2n2 +(2s5  26s4 
14s3 5s 1)s2n+(6s4+2s3 s2+1)s3)+n6+2(s2+s+2)n5 (4s3+s2+2s 5)n4+
2(s4 2s3+2s2 4s+1)n3+(5s3+20s+4)sn2+2( s4+4s3+s+2)sn 3(2s3+s2+1)s2:
The equilibrium levels of the taxes, ts and tns, for a signatory and non-signatory













the expression Bt is given by,





For comparison purposes, we present the solutions of the basic model where a
Cournot-IEA consisting of two countries is the unique self-enforcing IEA. In partic-
ular, we lay out the solutions derived by Rubio and Casino (2001).
Total emissions are given by,
Ec =
an
1 + n + s(s  1) : (3.66)




















(1 + n + s(s  1))2 ( + 1)

: (3.68)
A coalition consisting of two countries is the unique self-enforcing IEA if and only
if parameter  satises the following condition,
  1
n  4 + 2pn2   3n+ 3 : (3.69)
In the non-cooperative case, the basic model gives the following solutions.












The following list, presented in Table 3.3, includes the main variables used in the
present study. Note that it is not exhaustive.
Table 3.3: List of selected notation
Notation Explanation
edi Country is quantity produced and consumed domestically.
eds Signatorys quantity produced and consumed domestically.
edns Non-signatorys quantity produced and consumed domestically.
eIij(= e
X
ji) Quantity country i imports from country j.
eXij (= e
I
ji) Quantity country i exports to country j.
eIss(= e
X
ss) Signatorys imports from another signatory country.
eIsns(= e
X
nss) Signatorys imports from a non-signatory country.
eInss(= e
X
sns) Non-signatorys imports from a signatory country.
eInsns(= e
X
nsns) Non-signatorys imports from another non-signatory country.
epi Country is total production of the nonnumeraire good.
eps Signatorys total production of the nonnumeraire good.
epns Non-signatorys total production of the nonnumeraire good.
eci Country is total consumption of the nonnumeraire good.
ecs Signatorys total consumption of the nonnumeraire good.
ecns Non-signatorys total consumption of the nonnumeraire good.
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